The end of peasants'' poverty in China: a study on peasants'' poverty, peasants'' economic behavior, and the efficiency of national funds allocation in China by Yuan, Chun
Chun Yuan
The End of Peasants‘ Poverty in China 
A Study on Peasants‘ Poverty, Peasants‘ Economic 
Behavior, and the Effi ciency of National Funds 
Allocation in China
HHL - Leipzig Graduate School of Management 
Doctoral Thesis
© HHL - Leipzig Graduate School of Management, 2011
The sole responsibility for the content of this HHL doctoral thesis lies with the author/s. We encourage 
the use of the material for teaching or research purposes with reference to the source. The reproduc-
tion, copying and distribution of the paper for non-commercial purposes is permitted on condition that 
the source is clearly indicated. Any commercial use of the document or parts of its content requires the 
written consent of the author/s.
For further HHL publications see www.hhl.de/publications
 
The End of Peasants’ Poverty in China 
—A Study on Peasants’ Poverty, Peasants’ Economic Behavior, and the 




Inaugural Dissertation submitted to the Committee on Doctoral studies of 
 HHL—Leipzig Graduate School of Management  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  





Prof. Dr. Arnis Vilks 
Chair of Microeconomics 
HHL-Leipzig Graduate School of Management 
 
Second Asssessor: 
Prof. Dr. Jianzu Wu 






























This dissertation is dedicated to my wife and my daughter 

































©2011 Chun Yuan 





Though only my name appears on the cover of this dissertation, a great many people have 
contributed to its production. I owe my gratitude to all those people who have made this 
dissertation possible and because of whom my PhD experience has been one that I will 
cherish forever.  
My deepest gratitude is to my advisor, Professor Dr. Arnis Vilks.  I have been amazingly 
fortunate to have an advisor who gave me the freedom to explore on my own, and at the same 
time the guidance to recover when my steps faltered. Vilks has been always there to listen and 
give advice. I am deeply grateful to him for the long discussions that helped me sort out the 
ideas and thoughts of my work. I am also thankful to him for encouraging the use of correct 
grammar and consistent notation in my writings and for carefully reading and commenting on 
revisions of this manuscript. Vilks taught me how to question thoughts and express ideas. His 
patience and support helped me overcome many crisis situations and finish this dissertation. I 
hope that one day I would become as good an advisor to my students as Vilks has been to me.  
I am grateful to Professor Dr. Wilhelm Althammer. He taught me econometrics and his 
teachings inspired me to work on Chapter 7 of this dissertation. I am indebted to him for his 
selfless sharing of knowledge in this field.  
I am also thankful to my colleague and friend, Miss Martina Wuttke, with whom I shared an 
office for more than three years at HHL - Leipzig Graduate School of Management, for her 
encouragement and supporting of personal matters.  
I would like to acknowledge Professor Pierfrancesco La Mura for his inspiring lectures that 
helped me improve my knowledge in economics.  
 IV
I am also grateful to the former or current staff at Graduate school of management, for their 
various forms of support during my PhD study.  
Many German friends have helped me stay sane through these difficult years. Their support 
and care helped me overcome setbacks and stay focused on my PhD study. I greatly value 
their friendship and I deeply appreciate their belief in me.  
Most importantly, none of this would have been possible without the love and patience of my 
family, especially my wife, Wenting Hao. My family has been a constant source of love, 
concern, support and strength all these years. I would like to express my heart-felt gratitude to 
it.  
Finally, I appreciate the financial support from DAAD that funded parts of the research 




















Short Table of Contents 
 
1 Introduction ··························································································································1 
2 The Efforts, Features, and Problems of the Reduction of  
Peasants’ Poverty in the Past Three Decades in China·······················································11 
3 Literature Review on the Peasants’ Economic Behaviour···················································39 
4 The Job Choice and Land Rent Determination ···································································47 
5 The Human Capital Accumulation ·····················································································65 
6 The Rural-Urban Migration································································································81 
7 The National Funds Allocation Efficiency in China ·························································103 






















Extensive Table of Contents 
 
Acknowledgements ······························································································································ IV 
Short Table of Contents························································································································ VI 
List of Figures ······································································································································ XI 
List of Tables····································································································································· XIII 
List of Abbreviations························································································································· XIV 
List of Used Symbols ··························································································································XV 
 
1 Introduction ······································································································································ 1 
1.1Motivation ········································································································································· 1 
1.2 Important Concepts ·························································································································· 2 
1.2.1Poverty ·········································································································································· 2 
1.2.2 Absolute Poverty and Relative Poverty························································································· 3 
1.2.3 The Household Responsibility System (HRS) ·············································································· 7 
1.3 The Plan and Novelty of the Work ··································································································· 9 
 
2 The Efforts, Features, and Problems of the Reduction of Peasants’ Poverty in the  
Past Three Decades in China ········································································································· 11 
2.1 How Did the Problem of Peasants’ Poverty Originate and Evolve? ·············································· 11 
2.2 China’s Poverty Reduction Efforts································································································· 15 
2.2.1 Phase 1: Rural Reforms and the Implementation of the HRS ····················································· 15 
2.2.2 Phase 2: County-Based Poverty Reduction during 1986-1993 ··················································· 16 
2.2.3 Phase 3: The 8-7 Poverty Reduction Plan during 1994-2000 ····················································· 18 
2.2.4 Phase 4: The New Century Rural Poverty Alleviation Plan for 2001-2010································ 19 
2.3 Features of the Peasants’ Poverty Reduction ················································································· 20 
 VII
2.3.1 The Overall Achievement Is Remarkable ··················································································· 20 
2.3.2 The Decline in the Incidence of Poverty Was Uneven································································ 23 
2.3.3 The Role of Human Capital Is Crucial in Income Generating ···················································· 25 
2.3.4 Migration Is a Path out of Poverty, But it Is Restricted by many Factors··································· 26 
2.4 Existing Problems in China’s Poverty Reduction Course ······························································ 31 
2.4.1 The Total Funds for Poverty Alleviation Programs Are Insufficient ·········································· 31 
2.4.2 The Official Poverty Line Is Too Low to Reflect the Real Situation of Peasants’ Poverty ········ 33 
2.4.3 The Overall Economic Growth Has Become Less Responsive to Poverty Reduction················ 35 
2.4.4 Vulnerability to Poverty Extensively Exists················································································ 36 
 
3 Literature Review on the Peasants’ Economic Behaviour ··························································· 39 
3.1 About the Rationality of Peasants ·································································································· 39 
3.2 The Economic Behavior of Chinese Peasants before the Land  
Collectivization Movement in the Late 1950s ··············································································· 43 
3.3 The Economic Behavior of Peasants after 1978 under the HRS and the “Hukou” System ··········· 45 
 
4 The Job Choice and Land Rent Determination ············································································ 47 
4.1 Assumptions ··································································································································· 47 
4.2 The Job Choice······························································································································· 48 
4.3 The Land Rent Determination and the Corresponding Optimal Farm Scale·································· 50 
4.4 The Empirical Evidence ················································································································ 54 
4.4.1 Evidence for Proposition 1 ·········································································································· 55 
4.4.2 Evidence for Proposition 2 ·········································································································· 56 
4.4.3 A Case of the Land Rental Activities in L village ··············································································61 
4.4.4 Summary ····································································································································· 64 
 
 VIII
5 The Human Capital Accumulation ································································································ 65 
5.1 Introduction ··································································································································· 65 
5.2 The Basic Model ···························································································································· 70 
5.3 An Extension to the Case of an Imperfect Capital Market ···························································· 77 
5.4 Summary ········································································································································ 79 
 
6 The Rural-Urban Migration··········································································································· 81 
6.1 A Review of Todaro’s Work ·········································································································· 81 
6.2 A Review of the Harris-Todaro Model··························································································· 88 
6.3 Remarks on the Above Models ······································································································ 95 
6.4 Our Model ······································································································································ 96 
6.5 Empirical Evidence ······················································································································ 101 
6.6 Conclusions ································································································································· 102 
 
7 The National Funds Allocation Efficiency in China ·································································· 103 
7.1 Introduction ································································································································· 103 
7.2 Literature Review························································································································· 106 
7.3 Possible Relations between the Expected PLE and the PLF························································ 109 
7.3 Empirical Analysis ······················································································································ 115 
7.3.1 The Trends of Per-Capita Income of Urban and Rural Residents ············································· 115 
7.3.2 The Trends of Per-Capita Earnings of Urban and Rural Residents··········································· 117 
7.3.3 The Trends of Per-Capita Non-Earning Income of Urban and Rural Residents ······················· 118 
7.3.4 An Estimate for the Relationship between the Expected PLE and PLF in China ····················· 120 




8 Review and Conclusions ·············································································································· 123 
8.1 Review·········································································································································· 123 
8.2 Conclusions ·································································································································· 125 
8.3 Suggestions to Further Research ·································································································· 125 
Appendix ············································································································································ 127 






















List of Figures 
 
Figure 1.1 The Gini Coefficient for China’s Income Distribution ························································· 5 
Figure 1.2 Comparison of the Gini Coefficients of Various Countries in 2000 ····································· 6 
Figure 2.1 China’s Record of Poverty Reduction and Growth, 1981-2004 ········································· 22 
Figure 2.2 Uneven Progress in Poverty Reduction Measured by the World Bank 
                 Poverty Line, 1981-2004····································································································· 24 
Figure 2.3 Incomes Growth throughout the Distribution from the Bottom to Top 
                 Ends for China, 1990-2004 ································································································· 24 
Figure 2.4 Income Growth Incidence Curves for China for Various Sub-Periods 1990-2004 ············ 25 
Figure 2.5 Rising Tide of Rural Migrants, 2001-2007········································································· 27 
Figure 2.6 Migration Reduced the Probability of Poverty for Rural Households, 2003 ······················ 28 
Figure 2.7 China’s Poverty Line in Comparison with Other Countries-A··········································· 33 
Figure 2.8 China’s Poverty Line in Comparison with other Countries-B ············································ 34 
Figure 4.1 The Geometrical Demonstration of Job Choices of Peasants Facing Different Best  
Non-Farm Wage Rates ······································································································· 50 
Figure 6.1 The Geometrical Demonstration of the Equilibrium of Rural-Urban Migration in the 
Harris-Todaro Model ·········································································································· 93 
Figure 7.1 Relationship between the Expected PLE (I) and the PLF (s)-Case 1································ 112 
Figure 7.2 Relationship between the Expected PLE (I) and the PLF (s)-Case 2································ 113 
Figure 7.3 Relationship between the Expected PLE (I) and the PLF (s)-Case 3································ 114 
Figure 7.4 Annual Per-Capita Net Income of Urban and Rural Residents (1978-2008)···················· 116 
Figure 7.5 Urban to Rural Per-Capita Income Ratio (1978-2008) ····················································· 116 
Figure 7.6 Annual Per-Capita Earning of Urban and Rural Residents (1985-2008)·························· 117 
Figure 7.7 Urban to Rural Per-Capita Earning Ratio (1985-2008) ···················································· 118 
Figure 7.8 Annual Per-Capita Non-Earning Income of Urban and Rural Residents (1985-2008)····· 119 
 XI
Figure 7.9 Urban to Rural per Capita Non-Earning Income Ratio (1985-2008)································ 120                          
Figure 7.10 The Scatter Diagram of the Present Values of Earnings to Non-Earning Incomes in the  



























List of Tables 
Table 2.1 Number of National Designated Poor Counties by Region and Provinces in 2001 ············· 17 
Table 2.2 Poverty Lines for China in 2003 ·························································································· 21 
Table 2.3 Number of Poor (millions) under Alternative Poverty Standards, 1981 and 2004 ·············· 22 
Table 2.4 Income Poverty in China by Level of Education, 2003 ······················································· 26 
Table 2.5 Comparison between Rural Households with and without Migrant Workers, 2003············ 27 
Table 2.6 What Do Peasants in Poor Areas Say about Not Migrating? ··············································· 30 
Table 2.7 Central Government Funding for Poverty Alleviation Programs, 
1986 to 2002························································································································· 32 
Table 2.8 China’s Official Poverty Line and Its Relative Level in Various Years ······························ 35 
Table 2.9 The Annual Rural Poverty Reduction, the Growth Rate of Per-Capita GDP 
                and Farmers’ Consumption Level ························································································ 36 
Table 4.1 Job Choices of Rural Households in the 592 State Designated Impoverished 
                Counties in China 2007 ········································································································ 56 
Table 4.2 The Average Farm Scale in Different Countries of Different Periods ································· 58 
Table 4.3 The Landholdings Per Household and the Estimated Optimal Farm Scales in  
Ten Main Cereal Producing Provinces in China ·································································· 60 
Table 6.1 Characteristics of Rural Households in 5 Different Income Groups ·································· 102 












List of Abbreviations 
HRS—Household Responsibility System 
C&N Cost — Contracting and Negotiation Cost 
PLE— Personal Lifetime Earning 
PLF— Personal Lifetime Funds 
NBS—National Bureau of Statistics  
PPP— Purchasing Power Parity 
NPCSC—National People's Congress Standing Committee
CCCPC—The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 
UNDP— The United Nations Development Programme 



























Symbols used in Chapter 4 
tg ∂∂ — the marginal income of a peasant’s labour in his own plot  
wf — the farm wage rate 
w1— the non-farm wage rate for a peasant who has high productivity in his best non-farm job  
w2 — the non-farm wage rate for a peasant who has low productivity in any non-farm jobs 
tw — the total available working time  
q —the farm product  
h — the land area  
t — the labour input 
c— the monetary value of various material input 
R — the total land rent 
r — the market interest rate  
h  — the total area of a peasant’s landholding 
qt— the partial derivative of q with respect to t 
qc — the partial derivative of q with respect to c  
k —divided shares of one’s landholding 
h* — the optimal farm scale 
t* — the optimal labor input 
c*— the optimal capital invested 
h
R*




Symbols used in Chapter 5 
Ci — the amount of ordinary good consumed in period i  
Hi — the amount of human capital good consumed in period i 
L — the inheritance left over to his offspring by a peasant 
xci — the amount of composite ordinary commodity consumed in period i 
tci — the amount of composite time combined with xci  
xei — the amount of composite human capital commodity consumed in period i  
tei — the amount of composite time combined with xei  
twi — the amount of working time in the ith period 
t — the total time available during period i  
Ei— the stock of human capital at the beginning of the ith period  
di — the depreciation rate in period i  
ki — the on-the-job learning coefficient during period i 
vi — the sum of non-earning income during period i 
wi — the best wage rate in period i  
α — the transformation coefficient of human capital to wage rate 
λ  — Lagrangian multiplier which is equal to the marginal utility of wealth  
E1— the human capital endowment  
 
Symbols used in Chapter 6 
M& — the net rural migration 
M — the existing size of urban labor force  
( )uI t — the present value of the expected urban real income over the planning period 
( )rI t — the present value of the expected rural real income over the same planning period 
( )rR t  — the net expected rural real income in period t 
( )uR t — the net expected urban real income in period t 
 XVI
K(0)— the fixed cost of migration and relocation in urban area  
ν (t) — the probability of having modern sector job in period t  
ϖ (t)— the probability of being selected from the pool of urban traditional workers during period t if 
the worker is a member of that pool in period t  
N(t) — the total modern sector employment in period t  
η — the rate of industrial output growth  
λ — the rate of labor productivity growth in modern sector  
α — the natural rate of increase of the urban labor force  
( )tβ — the percentage urban-rural real income differential  
*G — the employment rate  
T* — the unemployment rate 
YA — the output of the agricultural good  
NA — the rural labor used to produce the agricultural good  
F — the fixed availability of land  
KA — the fixed capital stock in agricultural sector  
s —the agricultural production function 
s' — the derivative of q with respect of NA, 
YM — the output of the manufactured good, 
NM — the total labor required to produce XM 
KM — the fixed capital stock in industrial sector  
g—the industrial production function 
g' — the derivative of g with respect to NM  
p — the price of the agricultural good in terms of the manufactured good  
WA — the agricultural real wage  
WM — the manufacturing real wage  
e
uW — the expected real wage in the urban sector 
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MW  —the minimum wage in the urban sector  
Cia—the amount of ordinary commodity consumed either in the urban area or in the rural area 
Hia—the amount of human capital commodity consumed in ith period either in the urban area or in the 
rural area 
 
Symbols used in Chapter 7 
N—the population  
K—the total national funds 
s—the amount of the PLF one owns 
Ih(s) —the higher PLE one can create with PLF of s 
ρ(s) —the probability to create the higher lifetime earning Ih(s) 
Il(s) —the lower amount of PLE one can create with the amount s of PLF 
I —the expected amount of PLE 





“Like slavery and apartheid, poverty is not natural. It is man-made and it 
can be overcome and eradicated by the actions of human beings.” 






1.1 Motivation  
 
The problem of peasants’ poverty in China has long drawn considerable attention 
from economists, politicians, anthropologists, and others. Since the 1980s, many 
relevant articles and monographs have been published including qualitative study, 
empirical research, case study, and so on (e.g., Chen & Wu, 2005; Fei, 1989; World 
Bank, 2009; Ravallion & Chen, 2007). However, so far, most of the researches mainly 
focus on the issues of poverty measure, poverty targeting, causes of poverty, and 
poverty reduction strategies etc. There have been few attempts to formulate a theory 
of the poor peasants’ economic behavior, with which we can explain and further 
predict the choices of them under various circumstances and figure out the right way 
to lift them out of poverty. Such a behavioural theory may also serve as a theoretical 
premise both for further theoretical and empirical research in this field. 
 
Additionally, the current literature has shown that China has indeed made remarkable 
progress both in economic growth and the reduction of poverty in the past three 
decades, but little work has been done to answer questions like: 1) Does fighting 
peasants’ poverty in China promote economic growth? 2) Will allocating more 




overall economic performance of China or just the other way round? 3) Does an 
optimal national funds allocation exist, with which the economy can develop in a way 
that is both fast and just?   
 
To fill the gap in the literature, in this dissertation, besides a detailed presentation of 
the peasants’ poverty problem in China, we shall formulate, from the microeconomic 
perspective, a series of theoretical models of peasants’ economic behavior, including 
the vocational choice between farm and non-farm jobs, land rent determination, 
human capital accumulation, and the decision on rural-urban migration ; we shall also, 
with the implications derived from our theoretical models, try to answer the above 
questions in a novel and reasonable way.  
 
1.2 Important Concepts 
 
Before we proceed to the specific theoretical and empirical discussion, we would like 
to briefly introduce the relevant concepts, useful pre-knowledge and background in 
this introductory chapter, since having it will be helpful for the readers to 




According to the World Bank (2000): 
 
“Poverty is pronounced deprivation in well-being, and comprises many 
dimensions. It includes low incomes and the inability to acquire the basic goods 
and services necessary for survival with dignity. Poverty also encompasses low 
levels of health and education, poor access to clean water and sanitation, 
inadequate physical security, lack of voice, and insufficient capacity and 





Poverty generally can be measured from two related aspects: the economic aspect and 
the social aspect (Encarta, 2009; Krieger, 2002; Osmani 2003). The economic aspect 
of poverty focuses on material needs, including the necessities of daily living, such as 
food, drinking, clothing, shelter and so on. If the amount of living material for an 
individual, household, or community is less than a minimum standard, they are 
impoverished. Poverty in this sense may be understood as a condition in which a 
person, household, or community is lacking in the basic needs for a minimum 
standard of well-being and life, as a result of a persistent lack of income. The social 
aspect of poverty refers to a situation of lacking education, health care, and political 
power. In this sense, poverty may be understood as low social status in a society. Both 
economic and social aspects are positively related and the relationship is that the 
improvement in social aspects typically leads to corresponding improvement in 
economic aspects and vice versa. 
 
1.2.2 Absolute Poverty and Relative Poverty 
 
Although there are various methods to measure poverty, two of them are often used to 
define poverty in practice: absolute poverty measurement and relative poverty 
measurement. They both can be measured by income or consumption value that eases 
the work of gathering information and compile statistics. 
 
Absolute poverty measures set a poverty line at a certain income amount or 
consumption amount per year, based on the estimated value of a basket of goods 
(food, clothing, shelter, water, etc.) necessary for proper living. If $1 a day is set as 
the absolute income poverty line in a country, then anyone with an annual income of 
less than $365 would be considered impoverished. Alternatively, an absolute poverty 
line can also be based on the annual consumption. Anyone consuming goods annually 






The most commonly used absolute poverty line was proposed by the World Bank in 
1990, when the World Bank published the “World Development Report 1990” and 
found that most developing countries set their poverty lines at $1 a day (in constant 
1985 PPP1 prices). The World Bank (1990, p. 27) sets a low level of poverty line of 
$275 per person a year for those extreme poor countries and a relative higher level of 
poverty line of $370 per person a year for the other developing countries (both in 
constant 1985 PPP prices). The latter later became an international poverty line, with 
which, various cross-country comparisons became possible.   
 
Relative poverty measures are often used to measure the extent of income disparity in 
individual countries. By using them, the entire population is ranked in order of 
income per capita. The bottom 10% (or whatever percentage the government chooses 
to use) is then considered relatively poor. Usually, relative poverty is measured as the 
percentage of population whose incomes are less than some fixed proportion of 
median income in an economy.  
 
Moreover, there are also several other income inequality measures, for example the 
Gini coefficient (Gini Index) and the Theil Index. The Gini coefficient was proposed 
by Corrado Gini (1912) and published in “Variability and Mutability”. The Gini 
coefficient is a measure of the inequality: a value of 0 means absolute equality and a 
value of 1 means absolute inequality. The Gini index can be used as a measure of 
inequality of income or wealth. The Theil index was proposed by Henri Theil (1967). 
One outstanding and very convenient advantage of the Theil index is that it is a 
weighted average of inequality within subgroups, plus inequality among those 
subgroups. The decomposability is a property of the Theil index which the more 
popular Gini coefficient does not offer. However, the Gini coefficient is more 
intuitive to many people and easier to calculate. 
1Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is a calculated exchange rate of currency, based on different national 







The Gini Coefficient for China’s Income Distribution 
 
Figure 1.1 

































1.2.3 The Household Responsibility System (HRS) 
 
The Household Responsibility System has become a fundamental national policy in 
rural China since 1979. Under the Household Responsibility System, peasant 
households are granted the private using right of a certain area of farmland through a 
state lease; peasant households then take the responsibility of farm production for and 
payment to the government according to the terms on the state lease (Levinson & 
Christensen, 2002). 
The duration of the state lease at first was 15 years and then extended to 30 years (The 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China [CCCPC], 1984; 1993). Cheung 
(1989) argued that  
 
“[Although] ownership is not relinquished by the state, but the rights to use and to 
obtain income are exclusively assigned to the peasants. The right to transfer the 
leased resource may take the form of subletting. Various dues extracted by the 
state may be lumped together in the form of a fixed rent, and since this rent is paid 
to the state, it becomes a property tax. If indeed a perpetual lease is assigned, the 
land-holding becomes fee simple, and if the lease is freely transferable, the land is 
held in fee simple absolute or private property in its perfect form!” (p.586)  
 
Noticeably, the first extension of the state lease was carried on in 1993, one year 
before the expiry date of the earliest state lease in 1994. If peasants think that the state 
will always carry on an extension before its corresponding expiry date, then the actual 
effect of the state lease is equivalent to a permanent lease from the view of peasants. 
Thus, through out the text, unless otherwise state, we do not distinguish the HRS from 
the concept of private property right.  
 
Before 1979, Chinese villages were assigned compulsory production targets that 




production team, working under the supervision of a team leader, were credited with 
work points for the work they performed. At the end of a year, net team income was 
first distributed among members according to the basic needs; then the rest was 
distributed according to the work points that each one earned during that year. The 
work point system did not work well due to the fact that work points were often 
arbitrarily credited by the team leaders, and did not reflect the true effort of team 
members. Therefore, it was not an effective incentive scheme. (Levinson & 
Christensen, 2002; Sicular, 1991) 
 
In contrast, under the HRS, land is contracted to individual households for a certain 
years. According to “The Law of the Peoples Republic of China on Land Contract in 
Rural Areas” (Jiang, 2002),  
 
“The term of contract for arable land is 30 years. The term of contract for 
grassland ranges from 30 to 50 years. The term of contract for forestland ranges 
from 30 to 70 years；the term of contract for forestland with special trees may，
upon approval by the competent administrative department for forestry under the 
State Council, be longer” (section 3, article 20). 
 
After fulfilling the agricultural production responsibility, peasants are allowed to sell 
their surplus on the market or retain it for their own use. Thus, peasants become 
residual claimants. The marginal return on their efforts is equal to the marginal 
product of their efforts. In other words, by relating rewards directly to effort, the HRS 
enhanced incentives and promoted efficient production. The most conspicuous effect 
is the impact on productivity arising from the increased incentive to work. (Levinson, 
& Christensen, 2002) 
 
The HRS reform that symbolized the key to economic reform was implemented in 





1.3 The Plan and Novelty of the Work 
 
The plan of this dissertation is as follows: chapter 2 demonstrates the course, 
summarizes the features and points out the existing problems of China’s peasants’ 
poverty reduction since the late 1970s; chapter 3 provides a literature review on the 
economic behavior of peasants; chapters 4, 5, and 6 formulate a series of peasant’s 
behavioral models including the job choice and land rent determination, the lifetime 
human capital accumulation, and the rural-urban migration; chapter 7 begins with a 
discussion of three basic types-linear—concave, and convex—of the possible 
relationships between the personal lifetime earning (PLE)2 and the personal lifetime 
funds(PLF)3, and then comes up with the optimal approach of national funds4 
allocation for each type of relationship respectively; next we investigate and compare 
the funds allocation efficiency of the rural and urban residents respectively with the 
data from the China statistical year books; at last, in chapter 8, we conclude our 
research and advocate that it is high time for China to apply a carefully designed 
personal-income tax system and establish a sound welfare system, with which the 
aggregate national funds can be collected from and allocated among the whole 
population in an effective way, which can help achieve the goals of fast economic 
growth and justice. 
 
The novelty of this dissertation is that we, for the first time, connect three seemingly 
separated problems, namely the problems of peasants’ poverty, peasant’s economic 
behaviour, and the efficiency of the national funds allocation. The underlying 
consideration and logic is: viewing from many aspects, the problem of peasants’ 
poverty in China is far away from being solved and becoming harder; in order to 
solve the problem, it is required, in our opinion, to study the economic behaviour of  
2 For an explanation and the definition of “earning” in this dissertation, see footnote 26, p. 70; for the 
definition of PLE, see p. 71.   





peasants; by the individual behavioural analysis, the issue of national funds allocation 
turns up as the key for China to end peasants’ poverty, stay on a fast pattern of 
economic growth, and achieve the harmony of society.  
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Chapter 2 
 
The Efforts, Features, and Problems of the Reduction of 
Peasants’ Poverty in the Past Three Decades in China  
 
Chinese peasants on average are significantly poorer than their urban counterparts. 
According to World Bank (2009) there were still 10% of the entire population in 
China living below the one-dollar-a-day poverty line in 2004, all of them were 
peasants; the annual income per capita of peasants was only 4,140 Yuan, while the 
annual income per capita of urban residents was 13,786 Yuan in 2007 (National 
Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 2008). That is, the annual income per capita of urban 
residents is around 3.3 times that of peasants in relative value in 2007. The 
corresponding Gini coefficient in China had reached 0.447 by 2001(The United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2005). The serious peasants’ poverty and 
considerable and increasing rural-urban income disparity has even been a threat for 
and impeded further economic development and social stability. How has this 
problem appeared? What measures and efforts have been undertaken so far by the 
Chinese central government? What have been the main findings in the literature so far? 
In this chapter, we shall make a comprehensive review with the data, findings and 
conclusions in the literature.   
  
2.1. How Did the Problem of Peasants’ Poverty Originate and Evolve? 
 
Rural China was characterized by economic autarky and traditional agriculture before 
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the socialist system in 19564, following the model of the former Soviet Union, the 
central government purposely gave priority to the development of urban areas at an 
early stage of industrialization (Janvry, Sadoulet & Zhu, 2005). In doing so, enormous 
parts of rural land rent (as various forms of agricultural taxes and fees) was 
transferred either implicitly or explicitly from rural areas and from peasants to the 
industrial investments in the urban areas and to the urban residents. Consequently, this 
policy broke the old equilibrium between rural and urban economies and many 
peasants began to migrate from rural to urban areas spontaneously. However, the 
central government perceived the trend of rural to urban migration soon. In order to 
maintain a planned amount of the laborers in agricultural production as well as to get 
the migration from rural to urban areas under control, peasants were forced to stay in 
rural areas in two administrative ways: 1) the farmland collectivization, and 2) the 
civil status system which distinguished rural and urban residents through issuing two 
different civil identification cards called “Hukou” to rural and urban residents 
respectively and applying a corresponding food rationing system. Farmland 
collectivization tightly connected peasants’ income to their daily work-participation in 
collective production. The “Hukou” and the corresponding rationing system were 
used to distribute the supply of consumption goods and the access to non-farm jobs 
among people. Without acquiring the urban “Hukou”, rural-urban migrants could not 
settle permanently outside their places of origin since migrants coming from rural 
areas had no access to rationed food, urban social welfare, such as free public 
education, health care, low rent housing, etc. (Janvry et al., 2005). It was actually 
forbidden to migrate from rural to urban areas, except for students going to higher or 
professional education institutions, or workers recruited by state enterprises (Chan 
and Zhang, 1999). Consequently, these two rules gradually evolved China into a dual 
economy and society: Chinese economy and society was artificially separated into  
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two sectors: urban sector with an equalitarian income per capita and a corresponding 
fairish living standard, which is far above the absolute poverty level; and rural sector 
with extensive poverty, which is at the edge of the absolute poverty level. By the eve 
of the reform i.e., the year of 1978, the per capita annual incomes of peasants and 
rural residents were 133.6 Yuan and 343 Yuan respectively; and the ratio of annual 
income per capita of urban residents to rural registered residents was 2.37 (NBS, 
1995).    
 
Fortunately, the economic reform that began in 1978 brought huge changes to rural 
areas. First, the collapse of the system of “People’s Communes”, which had been the 
main method of so called rural collective ownership, as well as implementation and 
generalization of the HRS, gave greater freedoms and incentives to peasants: they 
could freely allocate their time and choose their own income strategies and productive 
activities. Second, the agricultural reform strongly increased agricultural production 
and the supply of grain in markets, which enabled the peasants living in urban areas 
without the urban civil status to purchase food in free markets. The rapid and great 
growth in grain’s production led to the central government finally abandoning the 
rationing system. Since 1984, the market for food became gradually open, and 
housing in cities became marketable. These two factors enabled peasants to enter 
cities and stay there permanently, even without changing their civil status.5 (Janvry et 
al., 2005)  
 
With the development of various private and non-state-owned enterprises, which were 
allowed in the early 1980s and then encouraged by the central government; the urban 
labor market was gradually established, making it possible for rural-urban migrants to 
seek jobs and to earn their livings in these non-state and private enterprises in cities.  
5If they maintained the rural “Hukou”, they could not enjoy the urban welfare, even if they lived there. 
Thus, the government since then turned to control the issuing of the urban “Hukou” and the annual 
shift rate from the rural “Hukou” to urban“Hukou”. 
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In addition, as Janvry et al. (2005) pointed out that the development of urban infra 
structure required much labor for construction, and the diversification of consumption 
resulting from the improvement of living standards of the urban residents created 
niches for a multiplicity of thriving small businesses. All these factors led to an 
increase in the demand for labor in urban areas, which induced a vast movement of 
agricultural labor from rural areas to urban areas. 
 
However, in rural areas, the per capita income continued to stay at a low level due to 
the fact that the labor-farmland ratio was still high. Or in other words, there existed a 
great number of surplus laborers in rural areas (Chu, Li, & Tsang, 2000; Li, 1996). 
Stagnant and low rural income strongly encouraged those surplus laborers to give up 
farming and then migrate to cities. 
 
When the gate of rural-urban migration was opened, the life of peasants dramatically 
changed: they could freely choose to work and live between villages and cities. 
Non-farm activities since then gradually became an importance source of income for 
rural households, which in turn caused an increasing demand for education and 
professional training that are absolutely necessary for non-farm jobs. Without surprise, 
the distribution of non-farm income was much more unequal than that of farm income 
among Chinese peasants. Hussain et al. (1994), comparing the distribution of farm 
and non-farm income, concluded that the unequal distribution of non-farm income 
was a key factor explaining the rise in inequality in rural household income. They 
suggested that the increase in inequality in rural household incomes should be mainly 
attributed to differences in individual skills, knowledge, capital endowments and luck, 
which created disparities in chances to participate in and earn from non-farm activities. 
With further economic development, the resulting differences in capital accumulation 
(physical and human) are expected to further widen inequality. Nonetheless, regional 
differences in natural conditions and cultures were also among the important reasons 
resulting in inequality. Where social and natural conditions are favorable, e.g. the 
coastal rural areas, the incomes increased and poverty was reduced fast, while in the 
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regions where social and natural conditions are not favorable, e.g., the western rural 
areas, the progress of income growth and poverty reduction were not so significant. 
Thus, the western rural areas became the main battlefield for fighting against poverty 
in China.  
 
2.2 China’s Poverty Reduction Efforts 
 
Needless to say, the central government has made a considerable effort to reduce the 
peasants’ poverty in China. Since 1978, the first year of the reform, China has started 
its “long march” for fighting against peasants’ poverty.  
 
China’s rural poverty reduction policies since 1978 can be roughly classified into four 
phases. These include 1) the rural reform of 1978-1985, 2) the National Poverty 
Reduction and Development Programs of 1986-1993, 3) the 8-7 Poverty Reduction 
Plan of 1994-2000, and 4) the New Century Rural Poverty Alleviation Plan for 
2001-2010 (Wang, Li, & Ren, 2004). In the following text, we will introduce the 4 
phases in details. 
 
2.2.1 Phase 1: Rural Reforms and the Implementation of the HRS  
 
“The most pressing problem during the early years of the post-1978 reform period 
was to boost rural economic growth through rural reforms.” (Wang et al., 2004, p. 8) 
At the beginning of the reform, the central government made a strong resolution to 
reduce poverty and develop the national economy. The central government chose the 
rural areas as the first experimental field. To develop the rural economy, the central 
government launched a series of reforms in rural areas, including the implementation 
of the HRS, improvement of the rural distribution systems, increase of the grain 
procurement prices, and so on. The fundamental and most important institutional 
change was the implementation of the HRS. The early rural reforms made a surprising 
record on rural poverty reduction as well as the growth of agricultural production. 
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According to Wang et al. (2004), the total grain yield increased at an annual rate of 
5.7%, while the income of peasants increased at an annual rate of 15%, due to the 
sharp increase of the government procurement prices on agriculture products. 
“Because of the planned procurement system and long-term shortage of agricultural 
products at that time, selling of agricultural products encountered no difficulty even 
after the sharp increases in production.” (Wang et al., 2004, p. 8) The dramatic 
income growth further resulted in an extensive poverty reduction. Between 1981 and 
1984, the poverty incidence measured at the one-dollar-a-day poverty line fell from 
53% to 24%, and the number of rural poor decreased from 250 million in 1978 to 125 
million in 1985 measured at China’s national poverty line (Ravaliion & Chen, 2007; 
NBS, 2005). 
 
2.2.2 Phase 2: County-Based Poverty Reduction during 1986-1993 
 
The Seventh Five-Year-Development-Plan (1986-1990) marks the beginning of 
China’s targeted rural poverty reduction and development programs. Since then, the 
central government has designated many poor counties as the basic unit for poverty 
targeting. These state designated poor counties, most in poor middle and west 
provinces, could receive special regional development funds from the government to 
support a subsidized loan program, food-for-work program, and poor-area 
development budgetary grants. Subsidized loans covered both households and 
enterprises in industry and agriculture, food-for-work program utilized surplus farm 
labor mainly to develop infrastructure, and government budgetary grants supported 
investment in poor areas across all the sectors (World Bank, 2001, 2009).  
 
Table 2.1 shows the numbers and distribution of the state designated poor counties: 
most of them are located in the middle and western provinces where the natural and 
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Number of National Designated Poor Counties by Region and Provinces in 2001 
 
Region Province Number of 
poor      
counties 
Region Province Number of 
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Source：Du, Park, & Wang (2005)，p. 30 
 
Out of the expectation of many people, the rural poverty reduction performance 
during this period was quite plain. The behind cause might be that in this period the 
central government had gathered enough experience and confidence in rural areas and 
decided to extend the reform to urban areas. It invested the bulk of the national funds 
in the urban areas, especially in some big cities, while just a trivial amount was 
invested in rural areas including the share for these state-designated counties. Thus, 
comparing the period 1986-1993 with 1978-1985, the growth rate measured by the 
per capita value added in agricultural sector dropped from 9.7% to 3.4%, and the 
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growth rate of annual income per capita of peasants fell from 12.2% to 2%, which led 
to the income gap between urban and rural residents widened (Wang et al., 2004). 
Noticeably, poverty reduction programs on average contributed just slightly more 
than 1 percentage point to peasants’ income and consumption growth (Jalan & 
Ravallion, 1998; Park, Wang and Wu, 2002).  
 
2.2.3 Phase 3: The 8-7 Poverty Reduction Plan during 1994-2000 
 
In 1994, the central government launched the 8-7 plan (the 8-7 Poverty Reduction 
Plan). The 8-7 plan was aspiring to lift the majority of the remaining 80 million poor 
out of poverty during the seven year period 1994-2000, hence the name “8-7”. This 
plan counted the number of the poor based on the national poverty line, i.e., the 
survival line rather than the one-dollar-a-day poverty line.  
 
“The 8-7 Plan aimed at 1) assisting poor households with land improvement, 
increased cash crop, tree crop and livestock production, and improved access to 
off-farm employment opportunities, 2) providing most townships with road 
access and electricity, and improving access to drinking water for most poor 
villages, 3) accomplishing universal primary education and basic preventive and 
curative health care, 4) graduating better-off counties in the coastal provinces 
from the newly-established list of nationally-designated poor counties, 5) 
managing well available funding, with attention to the appraisal and financial 
viability of poverty reduction investment activities, recovery of loan funds and 
leakage of poverty reduction funding to alternative activities, and 6) enlisting 
involvement and support from all government ministries and agencies, the 
coastal provinces and major municipalities, and other domestic and international 
organizations”(World Bank, 2009, p. 79). 
 
The 8-7 Plan targeted the state designated “poor” counties and emphasized the 
responsibility of local government leaders. It focused on three main programs: 
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subsidized loans, food-for-work, and government budgetary grants. Subsidized loans 
were over half of the total funds under the plan, at first covered mainly enterprises and 
later households with activities in industry and agriculture. The food-for-work 
program, representing almost 30 percent of total poverty funds, used surplus farm 
labor mainly to develop infrastructure. Government budgetary grants, accounting for 
less than 20 percent of the total poverty funds, supported investment in poor areas 
across sectors. In total, about 30 percent of poverty funds went to agriculture and 
industry each, and 35 percent to infrastructure” (Wang et al., 2004).   
 
The funds-input dramatically increased, compared to the second phase, so the overall 
achievement of this plan is quite satisfying: using the one-dollar-a-day poverty line, 
the total number of poor dropped from 237 million (20% of the total population) in 
1993 to 108 million (8.5% of the total population) in 2000 at an annual rate of 11% 
(World Bank, 2009). 
 
However, ineffective targeting was a major problem in the 8-7 plan. Since the 
targeting units in this plan were counties rather than households, the targeting was 
inevitable distorted which led to many better-off peasants obtained more funds and 
opportunities than the real poor. Wang et al. (2004), in their empirical research, 
showed that the poor households benefited less than better-off households in the 8-7 
plan. Additionally, another prominent problem of the 8-7 Plan is that it placed less 
emphasis on the aspects of education, training and health care. 
 
2.2.4 Phase 4: The New Century Rural Poverty Alleviation Plan for 2001-2010 
 
Realizing that the county-based poverty reduction programs were ineffective for 
targeting the poor, the central government redesigned a village-based plan with the 
title of “China’s Rural Poverty Reduction and Development Compendium 
(2001-2010)” in 2001, which was based on the fact that poor households were quite 
scattered across villages rather than concentrated in poor counties. Thus, a total of 
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148,000 poor villages were designated as targeting units (Dong, 2006). But the 
problem of distorted targeting still existed in this period. World Bank Report (2009,  
p. 88) shows that “integrated village development program has increased income by 
6.6% and consumption by 8.8% for the relatively better-off households in poor 
villages over the period of 2001 to 2004, while decreased income by 3.9% and 
increased consumption only 0.1% for the poorer households.” Nonetheless, the new 
plan began to emphasize human capital and social development in poor areas and 
encourages the participation of the poor in the poverty reduction programs.  
 
2.3 Features of the Peasants’ Poverty Reduction  
 
The following features are outstanding in the course of peasants’ poverty reduction: 
 
1) The overall achievement is dramatic. 
2) The decline in the incidence of poverty was uneven. 
3) The role of human capital is crucial in income generating. 
4) Migration has been a path out of poverty, but itself is restricted by many factors. 
 
2.3.1 The Overall Achievement Is Remarkable  
 
There are two poverty lines commonly used in China. One is the one-dollar–a-day 
poverty line proposed by the World Bank. The other is the official poverty line 
defined by the Chinese central government. Besides, there are also other poverty lines 
defined and used by a number of researchers in their own works. Table 2.2 makes a 
comparison among three alternative poverty lines. Noticeably, the official poverty line 
calculated by the NBS is the lowest, which only corresponds to the minimum income 
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Poverty Lines for China in 2003 (unit: Yuan) 
 
Table 2.2 
Source: World Bank, 2009, p. 5 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the headcount rate of poverty of population under three different 
poverty lines and the tendency curve from 1981 to 2004. Measured by China’s official 
poverty line (637 Yuan per year in 2003), the extreme poverty rate in rural China fell 
from 18.5% in 1981 to 2.8% in 2004. If measured by the World Bank’s poverty line 
of 888 Yuan per person per year in 2003, China’s extreme poverty rate declined from 












The Efforts, Features, and Problems of the Reduction of Peasants’ Poverty in the Past Three Decades in China 
China’s Record of Poverty Reduction and Growth, 1981-2004 
 
Figure 2.1 
Source: World Bank, 2009, p. 3 
 
Table 2.3 shows number of poor under different poverty lines of the years 1981 and 
2004. Measured by absolute terms, the number of rural poor under the official poverty 
line declined from 152 million in 1981 to 14.79 million in 2004, while by the 
one-dollar-a-day poverty line, the absolute number of poor declined from 652 million 
in 1981 to 135 million in 2004.  
  
Number of Poor (millions) under Alternative Poverty Standards, 1981 and 2004 
 
Table 2.3 
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The above figures have clearly indicated that China’s achievement in extreme poverty 
reduction in the past is very remarkable no matter measured by what poverty standard 
and by what term, say relative term or absolute term.  
 
2.3.2 The Decline in the Incidence of Poverty Was Uneven  
 
The progress of extreme poverty reduction was dramatic in China over 1980–2001, 
but was uneven over time and across different provinces (Ravallion and Chen, 2007). 
In figure 2.2, we can distinguish five broad phases consistent with the five Five-Year- 
Plans.6 Figure 2.2 also shows the consumption poverty incidence and the changes in 
number of poor of each five-year plan. We can see both the poverty incidence and the 
absolute number of poor declined most rapidly during the 6th, 8th, and 10th Plans 













6The Five-Year-Plans of China are a series of economic development initiatives set by the CCCPC and 
the National Congresses of China. As China has transitioned from the Soviet-style planned economy to 
a market economy termed as socialist market economy, the name of the five-year program is 
sometimes called “guideline” instead of “plan” by the Chinese government.  
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Source: World Bank, 2009, p. 12 
 
Additionally, the income of household grew uneven too. Figure 2.3 displays the 
annual rate of growth between the two years of 1990 and 2004, for each percentile of 
the income distribution in the order from the poorest to the richest percentile.  
 
Incomes Growth throughout the Distribution from the Bottom to Top Ends  
for China, 1990-2004 
 
Figure 2.3 
Source: the World Bank, China Poverty Report, March, 2009, p. 14 
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As can be seen in Figure 2.3, the real income growth rates over the period from 1990 
to 2004 varied from 3% per year for the poorest percentile to above 8% for the richest 
percentile. It implies that if there is no income redistribution measure, then the income 
disparity will increase since the rich have higher rate of income growth than the poor. 
 




Source: World Bank, 2009, p.14 
 
An interesting finding is that a decrease in inequality seems to promote higher growth 
rates- as can be seen in Figure 2.4, the two periods with the most pro-poor growth and 
falling inequality, i.e., the periods of 2003–2004 and 1993–1996, were also the 
periods when growth of income per capita was the highest. This finding can also be 
used as powerful evidence to support our argument later in chapter 7.  
 
2.3.3 The Role of Human Capital Is Crucial in Income Generating 
 
It should be no doubt that most of the poor in China are able to work. Hence, the issue 
of improving their productivity is crucial. Table 2.4 ranks poverty rates according to 
the average years of schooling of peasant laborers. The peasant laborers refer to those 
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who are 16 years or older, not students, and have work abilities. 
 
Income Poverty in China by Level of Education, 2003 
 
Table 2.4 
Source: World Bank, 2009, p. 62 
 
We can see that the higher schooling years correspond to lower poverty incidence, 
under both the World Bank line and twice the World Bank line. For instance, using 
the World Bank poverty line, the incidence of poverty is 16.3% for the category of 
“less than 6”, while it is only 0.1% for the category of “greater than 12”. It also 
clearly shows the trend that the mean incomes increase with the increasing of the 
schooling years. 
 
2.3.4 Migration Is a Path out of Poverty, but it Is Restricted by many Factors 
 
Migration is a path to poverty alleviation. For instance, the annual per-capita income 
is 8968.2 Yuan of a migrant worker which is 2.17 times of the annual per-capita rural 
per capita income 4140 Yuan in 2007 (NBS, 2008, pp. 175-179). Evidence also 
indicates that households with migrant workers are less likely to be poor than 
households without any migrant workers. Table 2.5 shows that measured by the 
one-dollar-a-day poverty line, the income poverty rate for households with migrants is 
7.5% in contrast to 10.9% for households without migrants. Moreover, nearly 
two-thirds of the poor individuals live in households without a migrant worker, much 
larger than the ratio of households of 57% in the entire rural population. 
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Source: World Bank, 2009, p. 102 
 
Figure 2.5 shows the estimates of number of migrants from 2001 to 2007. The total 
number of migrants from rural areas is thus estimated 137 million which amounts to 
about 18.8% of the entire rural population of 725 million in 2007.  
 
 
Rising Tide of Rural Migrants, 2001-2007 
(Number of Rural Migrants, Million) 
 
Figure 2.5 
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However, households with migrants differ from households without migrants in many 
other respects. Figure 2.6 shows that migration indeed reduces the probability of 
being poor. No matter referring to income or consumption poverty, the probability of 
being poor for the case of “without migrant worker” is always higher than that for the 
case of “with migrant worker”.  
 
Migration Reduced the Probability of Poverty for Rural Households, 2003 
 
Figure 2.6 
Source: World Bank, 2009, p. 103 
 
But migration itself is restricted by many factors. Du, Park and Wang (2005) 
conducted a survey in four state designated poor counties located in four different 
provinces in western China. In the survey, they collected the direct responses from 
peasants on the most important factors affecting the migration decisions of men in 
general, women in general, and their own respectively. The responses of their survey 
can be classified into the following 11 categories: 
 
1) Financial constraints—the surveyed person lacks migration funds.  
2) Information—the surveyed person lacks job information and social networks. 
3) Urban lifestyle— the surveyed person dislikes the urban lifestyle.  
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4) High local income opportunities—the surveyed person is satisfied with his current 
local income. 
5) High urban cost of living—the surveyed person can’t afford the high urban cost of 
living.  
6) Education—the surveyed person lacks sufficient education level to migrate. 
7) Children—the surveyed person has to take care of his or her children at rural home. 
8) Farm labor demand—the farm work is more attractive than migration for a 
  surveyed person. 
9) “Hukou” system—the rural “Hukou” restricts migration.  
10) Support from local government—support from local government on migration is 
too weak. 
11) Support from urban governments—support from the urban government of the 
migration destination is too weak. 
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Source: Du, Park and Wang (2005), p. 36 
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The top four answers for men exceeding 10 percent are farm labor demand (25.9 
percent), education (25.3 percent), information and social networks (18.3 percent), 
and financial constraints (18.3 percent). For women, the answers exceeding 10 
percent were children (46.2 percent), farm labor demand (21 percent), and education 
(12.7 percent). Many scholars ever argue that China’s “Hukou” system, as well as 
restrictive or discriminatory policies in urban areas are the main barriers of migration 
(Wang, 2004; Yang and Cai, 2003; Meng and Zhang, 2001). To one’s surprise, in this 
survey, the Hukou system, urban government policy, local government policy, and 
high urban living costs, which are related to urban or local policies received the 
fewest responses, all less than 2 percent for both men and women. For this, the 
authors explained “such subjective reports must be interpreted cautiously, because 
they could reflect greater awareness of such factors rather than their actual importance 
(for example, labor demand conditions may be viewed as immutable), the lack of 
perception that policies restricting migration are not viewed as barriers by the poor is 
an important result” (Du, Park, & Wang, 2005, p. 36).  
 
2.4 Existing Problems in the Course of China’s Poverty Reduction 
 
2.4.1 The Total Funds for Poverty Alleviation Programs Are Insufficient   
 
Three different government agencies provide funding for official poverty alleviation 
programs: 1) the Agricultural Bank of China, and more recently the Rural Credit 
Cooperatives, with interest subsidies paid by the Ministry of Finance of China provide 
loans to rural households and enterprises for income-generating projects; 2) the 
National Development and Reform Commission finances Food-for-Work rural 
infrastructure projects, usually by paying for material costs, while villages contribute 
labor, especially for roads and drinking water; 3) the Ministry of Finance provides 
earmarked budgetary grants to local governments to finance a wide range of public 
investment projects in poor areas, nevertheless the total funds are still quite low 
(Wang et al. 2004). 
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Since 2001, on average about 28 billion Yuan has been provided annually by the 
government through these three agencies, which however, measured in terms of the 
per capita per poor, is only about 200 Yuan annually, not to mention that about half of 
the total funding has been in the form of subsidized loans rather than grants. 
 
Central Government Funding for Poverty Alleviation Programs, 
 1986 to 2002 
(Unit: Billion Yuan) 
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2.4.2 The Official Poverty Line Is Too Low to Reflect the Real Situation of 
Peasants’ Poverty  
 
China’s official poverty line was first set down in the early 1980s and it has been used 
to monitor poverty levels for the periods afterwards. For some reason, the government 
showed no interest to update it according the development of economy and the change 
in wealth distribution. With the time going, today’s official poverty line seems too 
low both compared both to international standards and the per capita GDP. Figure 2.7 
shows that of the 63 countries, only eight countries’ national poverty lines are lower 
than the one-dollar-a-day line, whereas the national poverty line of China is the lowest. 
Figure 2.8 with another set of dada further convinces us on this finding. 
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China’s Poverty Line in Comparison with Other Countries-B 
 
Figure 2.8 
Source: World Bank, 2009, p. 19 
 
Moreover, as can be seen in table 2.8, the official poverty line, which was about 24% 
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China’s Official Poverty Line and Its Relative Level in Various Years 




The ratio of official 
poverty line to 
farmers’ per capita 
net income (%) 
The ratio of official 
poverty line to per 

































































Source: Hu, Hu & Chang, 2003, p. 11 
 
2.4.3 The Overall Economic Growth Has Become Less Responsive to Poverty 
Reduction  
 
Although in early 1980s, the economic growth had very strong positive correlation 
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The Annual Rural Poverty Reduction, the Growth Rate of Per-Capita GDP and 
Farmers’ Consumption Level 
 















































Source: Hu, et al. 2003, p. 3 
 
As can be seen in Table 2.9, in the period 1978-1985, a growth rate of per capita GDP 
of 8.3% corresponds to a number of out-of-poverty peasants 17.86 millions, while in 
the period 1990-1997, the higher growth rate of per capita GDP of 9.9 only 
corresponds to the number of 5 million.   
 
2.4.4 Vulnerability to Poverty Extensively Exists 
 
Many poor peasants are often stricken back into poverty by various causes. We can 




Usually, the natural conditions in poor areas are unfavorable or even hostile. The 
crippled agricultural infrastructure further worsens the resistibility of poor areas to 
drought, floods, hail, pests and other natural disasters. In this case, disasters often 
result in many just-out-of-poverty peasants to be poor again.   
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2) Illnesses 
 
As a sound health insurance program is not seen in rural areas, once a member of 
rural family unfortunately gets a serious illness, all members of the family have to 
bear the most part of medical expenses by themselves, which often leads them into 
debt and poverty.  
 
3) Schooling  
 
In recent years, with a series of marketization reforms of the higher and professional 
education system in China, the education fees rushed up and have become a heavy 
burden on rural poor families. The tuition fee of a university usually is equal to a 
multiple of the net income per capita of poor peasants. For example, the tuition fee of 
Lanzhou University (my home university) is 4200 Yuan per year, while the net 
income per capita of peasants of the state-designated counties is only 2278 Yuan per 
year in 2007 (NBS, 2008). Many rural families become poor again just after the 
payment of the tuition fee for their children to go to professional schools and 
universities. 
 
4) Giving birth to sons 
 
Due to lacking a modern pension system in rural China, when peasants become old 
and not able to work, they have to be supported by their sons other than their 
daughters according to the Chinese rural conventions, which make them have a strong 
preference for having sons. Despite the implementation of the one-couple-one-child- 
policy and the corresponding fine to infringements, some peasants continue to give 
birth to children until they have a son, which makes the “unlucky” families with many  
children are vulnerable to being poor: before they have a son, on the one hand, they 
might have given birth to many daughters, which increases their family expenditures; 
on the other hand, they might have been be fined heavily by the local government as 
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the punishment of violating the one-couple-one-child policy.   
 
5) The price decline and fluctuation of agricultural products in recent years 
 
The prices of agricultural products often fluctuate in recent years. Due to lacking 
market information, peasants in remote rural areas have to choose crops according to 
some out-dated information. Sometimes, the prices of agricultural products fall 
heavily due to an excessive aggregate supply in markets, which will result in a loss for 
peasants. In the case it happens, many just-out-of-poverty peasants will be 
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Chapter 3 
 
Literature Review on the Peasants’ Economic Behaviour 
 
As we have planned, from chapter 4 to chapter 6, we will propose our theoretical 
models of peasants’ economic behaviour. In this chapter, we will present a brief 
review of the relevant literature, which indeed has served as a source of inspiration for 
our whole work. The researches can be largely divided into the following 3 
categories：1) about the rationality of peasants; 2) about various types of behavior of 
Chinese peasants before the Land Collectivization Movement in late 1950s; 3) about 
the behavior of Chinese peasants after 1978 under the HRS System and “Hukou” 
system.7 
 
3.1 About the Rationality of Peasants 
 
The rationality is a disputable concept in economics (Blume & Easley, 2008), which, 
however, does not affect the fact that “many economic theories are built upon the 
assumption that decision makers (people or institutes) are perfectly rational” (Tsang, 
2008). Our theoretical models, without exception, will be also based on the 
assumption that peasants, like any other social groups (industrial workers, 
businessmen, etc.), are rational in economic activities. Nonetheless, in the impression 
of some people, peasants, especially the poor peasants, seemed irrational (e.g., Xie, 
2001; Chen, 2001). In order to reasonably and “safely” apply the assumption of  
 
 
7 From the late 1950s to the late 1970s, the farmlands in rural China were collectively owned and the 
agriculture production was planned and directed by the government, which is therefore a form of 
planned economy. For this reason, peasants’ economic behavior during this period is excluded from our 
research scope in this dissertation.  
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rationality into our models, it is worthwhile to take a glance at some representative 
viewpoints first. 
 
In “The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam”, 
Samuel Popkin(1979) considered that a peasant farm can be described with the 
analogy of a capitalist firm aiming to maximize gains by rationalizing production and 
balancing short-and-long-term interest. Popkin’s relevant argument is cited as 
follows:  
 
“Peasants are continuously striving not merely to protect but also to raise their 
subsistence level through long and short term public and private investments. 
Their investment logic applies to both market and non-market exchanges. By 
arguing that the exchanges between peasants are shaped and limited by conflicts 
between individual and group benefits, I will demonstrate that villages are best 
viewed as corporations instead of communes, and that patrons with multi-stranded 
ties to peasants are best seen as monopolists instead of paternalists ”(p.4). 
 
However, Weber (2004) and Scott (1976) insisted that peasants were irrational. For 
instance, Weber exemplified:  
 
“In agriculture…the gathering of the harvest is a case where the greatest possible 
intensity of labor is called for, since, the weather being uncertain, the difference 
between high profit and heavy loss may depend on the speed with which the 
harvesting can be done. Hence a system of piece rates is almost universal in this 
case. And since the interest of the employer in a speeding, up of harvesting 
increases with the increase of the results and the intensity of the work, the attempt 
has again and again been made, by increasing the piece rates of the workmen, 
thereby giving them an opportunity to earn what is for them a very high wage, to 
interest them in increasing their own efficiency. But a peculiar difficulty has been 
met with surprising frequency: raising the piece rates has often had the result that 
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not more but less has been accomplished in the same time, because the worker 
reacted to the increase not by increasing but by decreasing the amount of his work. 
A man, for instance, who at the rate of 1 mark per acre mowed 2 1/2 acres per day 
and earned 2 1/2 marks, when the rate was raised to 1.25 marks per acre mowed, 
not 3 acres, as be might easily have done, thus earning 3.75 marks, but only 2 
acres, so that he could still earn the 2 1/2 marks to which he was accustomed. The 
opportunity of earning more was less attractive than that of working less. He did 
not ask: how much can I earn in a day if I do as much work as possible? But: how 
much must I work in order to cam the wage, 2 1/2 marks, which I earned before 
and which takes care of my traditional needs? This is an example of what is here 
meant by traditionalism. A man does not “by nature” wish to cam more and more 
money, but simply to live as he is accustomed to live and to earn as much as is 
necessary for that purpose” (para.21).  
 
The suggestion of Coleman (1990, p. 20) can be an explanation of Weber’s finding. 
Coleman argued that a rational action is to achieve a certain purpose through 
interpersonal or social exchanges, a certain action that requires rational consideration 
(or calculation) on a variety of affecting factors on this purpose. An outsider can not 
judge whether an actor is rational or not, because he might not be able to know 
exactly what the affecting factors are.  
 
In “Transforming Traditional Agriculture”, Theodore Schultz (1964, pp.14-64) argued 
powerfully that peasants were not lazy, inept, or irrational in their economic behavior, 
as some people might think they were. They were in fact enterprising and optimizing 
users of resources. Peasants however, were seriously constrained by the traditional 
agriculture. The traditional agriculture was an agriculture form without the input of 
mechanical power and chemical fertilizer. The traditional agriculture might have been 
poor, but it was highly efficient in the allocation of production factors. According to 
Schultz, in pursuing the production efficiency, a peasant behaves as well as a capitalist 
entrepreneur. 
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Vilks (2006) points out that  
 
“‘rationality’ has a double meaning. It covers both rationality of choice, and 
rationality of reasoning. Rationality of choice means that relative to the 
information you happen to have, you choose what you prefer most among the 
options you consider possible… [Rational reasoning means the reasoning process] 
is correct, and that no relevant inference fails to be made.” (pp. 2-3) 
 
Considering all above arguments and according the classification of Vilks, we 
conclude that:  
 
1) Concerning the rationality of choice: to be rational means to act strictly according a 
certain preference, given certain information. Peasants are rational in this sense, 
because they always choose the choice they prefer most, subject to the information 
they have.  
 
2) Concerning the rationality of reasoning, to be rational means to practice reasoning 
correctly and logically. Peasants may make mistakes in reasoning, since they may 
lack knowledge of correct reasoning. However, a peasant’s knowledge of correct 
reasoning can also be understood as a part of the information he has. Thus, peasants 
are also rational in the sense, subject to the information including the knowledge of 
correct reasoning. Additionally, peasants can learn from error and then gradually 
achieving the knowledge of correct reasoning in practice. Moreover, they can also 
imitate the behavior of the successful persons or adopt the advice of experts, which 
can dramatically make up for their deficiencies in reasoning.  
 
At last, we argue that it is reasonable to base our study on peasants on the assumption 
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3.2 The Economic Behavior of Chinese Peasants before the Land Collectivization 
Movement in the Late 1950s  
 
Huang (1985) investigated the economic behavior of various rural residents of 1930s 
in China including landowners, rich peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants and 
tenants from a historian’s perspective in “The Peasant Economy and Social Change in 
North China”. Landlords were those who depended mainly on land rent for a living. 
Rich peasants were those who hired one or more year-laborers. Middle peasants were 
those who did most of the farm work themselves. Poor peasants referred to those who 
were hired by the landlords and rich peasants, usually as day-laborers, in addition to 
cultivate their own or rented small plot. The tenants, who generally had little own 
farmland, were also hired to cultivate the farmland of landlords and rich peasants. 
Huang found that the village social reality was much more complex than one could 
expect: Some landlords both leased out land and used hired labor; some small 
peasants both rented land and worked for others as laborers; and others, rented land 
and employed wage labour instead of working for others. The complexity of 
production relations, in our opinion, can be explained by the economic efficiency 
considerations of all parties involved.       
 
Cheung (1968) developed a theory of share tenancy that was one of the main forms of 
land tenure under the peasant economy in China before the1950s.  
 
“Share tenancy is a land lease under which the rent paid by the tenant is a 
contracted percentage of the output yield per period of time. As a rule, the 
landowner provided land and the tenant provided labor; other inputs may be 
provided by either party.” (p. 1107)  
 
Share tenancy is thus a kind of share contracting, defined by Cheung as  
 
“two or more individual parties combining privately owned resources for the 
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production of certain mutually agreed outputs, the actual outputs to be shared 
according to certain mutually accepted percentages as returns to the contracting 
parties for their productive resources.” (p. 1107)   
 
Cheung argued that the impression that the tenancy with fixed land rent is superior to 
the share tenancy was wrong. Both theoretically and empirically that the resource 
allocation under private property rights is the same whether the landowner cultivates 
the land himself, hires farm hands to do the tilling, leases his holdings on a fixed rent 
basis, or shares the actual yield with his tenant. In other words, different contractual 
arrangements do not imply different efficiencies of resource use as long as these 
arrangements are themselves aspects of private property rights; additionally, 
implications of alternative theories were tested against observations obtained from 
Asian agriculture. By further inquiring into the choice of contract and various 
stipulations of land leases, he also showed that the observed leasing arrangements are 
consistent with his theory. The allocation of resources will differ, however, if private 
property rights are attenuated or denied, or if the government overrules the market 
process of allocation.  
 
Fei (1938), in his book “Peasant Life in China”, detailed the peasant life of 
consumption, production, distribution and exchange of wealth among the Chinese 
peasants observed in a village, Kaihsiekung in 1930s, eastern China. He found that in 
the process of consumption there are no essential classifications into which the 
villagers must be divided, but in the process of production occupational differentiation 
is found. According to his census, occupations were classified under four types: (1) 
agriculture, (2) special occupations (small businesses), (3) fishing, and (4) non- 
occupied. These classes are not mutually exclusive. Persons not classified as 
agricultural may nevertheless be partly engaged in agricultural activities. Agriculture 
is the fundamental occupation common to nearly all the villagers except among the 
landless outsiders. He noticed also the interesting arrangement of land ownership: 
land is divided into two layers: namely, the surface and the subsoil. The possessor of 
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the subsoil is the title holder of the land. His name will be registered with the 
government because he pays the taxes on the land. But he may possess only the 
subsoil without the surface, that is, he has no right to use the land directly for 
cultivation. Such a person is called an absentee landlord. The person possessing both 
the surface and the subsoil is termed the full owner. The one possessing only the 
surface without the subsoil is termed tenant. 
 
3.3 The Economic Behavior of Peasants after 1978 under the HRS and the 
“Hukou” System 
 
Knight and Song (2003), based on a nationally representative rural labour force 
survey of China, explored the allocation of labour among farming, local non-farming 
and temporary migration activities under the HRS. Various tests of labour market 
segmentation are conducted. According to their estimation, the returns to labour off 
the farm greatly exceed those on the farm. The relationship between days worked off 
and on the farm suggests that the opportunity cost to households of non-farm work is 
very low; however, tastes, imperfect information, imperfect capital markets, 
risk-aversion and transaction costs are also relevant. The overcoming of the obstacles 
to diversification away from farming is important for rural development in China.  
 
Chan and Zhang (1999) introduced the origins and changes of the “Hukou” system 
and examined its effect. They argued that the “Hukou” system not only restricts 
personal free migration but also causes social segregation. “It is both the base and 
product of an authoritarian and segmented society” and can only “function in a closed 
command economy.” (p. 27). However, with the development of market economy in 
China, it has become increasingly incompatible. Windrow and Guha (2005) examined 
the effect of the “Hukou” system on urban governments. They found that the urban 
governments reaped profits by “selling” urban “Hukous” to migrants. The prices of an 
urban “Hukou” may differ in different cities according to their respective 
attractiveness to migrants. The urban “Hukou” in fact has been commercialized in 
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China, while migrants become victims of the extortionate implementation of the 
unfair “Hukou” system. 
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Chapter 4  
 
The Job Choice and Land Rent Determination 
 
In this section we shall analyze the problems of job choice and land rent 
determination of the peasants as small landowners. Our analysis within this chapter is 
based on the premise of income maximization subject to the constraints of private 




1) Each peasant is a small landowner who privately owns a small piece of farmland 
that will be called his landholding in the following text. 
 
2) All peasants are identical in farm productivity and therefore they face the same 
farm wage rate. 
 
3) The using right of farmland is exclusive and transferable.  
 
4) The farmland has only agricultural use, so we don’t consider the case of shifting 
the use of land from farming to other industries. 
 
5) There is a perfect competitive good market, capital market, and labor market. All 
information is perfect and complete.  
 
6) The labor market determines non-farm wage rates for peasants according to their 
respective stock of human capital, i.e., the specific industrial talent, skill, or 
know-how if they choose to work in non-farm jobs. 
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7) Contracting and negotiation cost (C&N cost) is low and can be neglected for our 
research purpose. 
 
8）All peasants are rational.  
 
4.2 The Job Choice   
 
For simplicity, let us assume presently that a peasant’s input is only his labour. In 
figure 4.1, the labour is measured along the horizontal axis and tg ∂∂ represents the 
marginal income of a peasant’s labour in his own landholding. The farm wage rate wf 
is horizontal under a competitive labour market. Let w1 denote the non-farm wage rate 
for a peasant who is high productive in his best non-farm job,8 which is supposed to 
be higher than wf . Let w2 denote the non-farm wage rate for a peasant who is poorly 
productive in any non-farm jobs, which is supposed to be lower than wf . Moreover, tw 
is the total available working time for a peasant, which is assumed identical among all 
peasants. Thus, we have three cases to discuss: 
 
Case 1: The best non-farm wage rate9 a peasant faces is lower than wf. 
 
If the best non-farm wage rate, a peasant faces, is lower than wf, as a rational person, 
he will specialize in farming, that is, he will spend all his labour in farming with t1 
spent in his own landholding and tw - t1 in the landholding (or landholdings) of another 
peasant (or other peasants) who is (or are) willing to hire him or lease his (or their)  
 
8In this dissertation, we define the best non-farm job for a peasant as the one, with which he can earn 
the highest wage among all the feasible non-farm jobs for him.  
9The best non-farm wage rate for a peasant is therefore the corresponding wage rate for his best 
non-farm job.  
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landholding (or landholdings) to him. Thus, his net income will be represented by the 
area OAFGtw, with the area OAFt2 as the income obtained from farming in his own 
landholding, and area t1FGtw from the farming in the landholdings of other peasants. 
The area EAF is the receipt of land rent that is a kind of non-earning income. 
 
Case 2: The best non-farm wage rate the peasant faces is higher than wf. 
 
In case the non-farm wage rate the peasant faces is higher than wf, he will specialize 
in his best non-farm job. In order to obtain the land rent from his own landholding, he 
can choose to hire a farmhand, whose best non-farm wage rate is no higher than wf, to 
do the farming in his landholding rather than himself and pay the farmhand the wage 
rate wf. Hence he can obtain the net income represented by the sum of areas of OBDtw 
and EAF, with the area OBDtw as the part obtained from the best non-farm job and the 
area EAF as the receipt of land rent; alternatively he can also choose to lease his 
landholding to a tenant and charge him a fixed land rent which in quantity is identical 
to the one derived from the hiring approach, also depicted as the area EAF in Figure 
4.1. It is easy to see that he will be indifferent between the hiring approach and the 
leasing approach. 
 
Case 3: The non-farm wage rate the peasant faces is equal to wf. 
 
In this case, the peasant will be indifferent between farming and his best non farm job.  
He can either specialize in farming or in his best non-farm job, or do both types of 
jobs. Under this condition, his net income is represented by the area OAFGtw, with 
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The Geometrical Demonstration of Job Choices of Peasants  




4.3 The Land Rent Determination and the Corresponding Optimal Farm Scale 
 
From the above analysis, we have concluded that the condition for a peasant to do his 
best non-farm job is that the best non-farm wage rate he faces is at least as high as the 
prevailing market farm wage rate; whatever the best non-farm wage rate he faces and 
the job he does are, he can always obtain the same amount of land rent. Thus, the 
problem of land rent determination can be separated from the problem of job choice 
and therefore becomes an independent problem in this sense. One may have noted that 
the amount of land rent derived in the last section might not be at its maximal level 
yet since the production function and the farm scale have not been taken into account 
so far. In this subsection, we will analyze further how the land rent for a certain plot 
and the corresponding optimal farm scale are determined.  
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Let the farm production function be q=q(h, t, c), which is assumed to be concave in h, 
t and c, where q is the amount of product, h, t, and c, are amounts of land area, labour 
input, and the monetary value of various material input, respectively. Suppose the 
market price of the farm product is p. 
 
Thus, the peasant will face a problem of land rent maximization in his landholding, 
which is represented as: 
 
Max R=pq( h , t, c)-wft-c(1+r), t>0, c>0,  (4.1) 
 
where R is the total land rent, r is the market interest rate and h  is the total area of 
his landholding.  
 
There is no difficulty at all to solve this simple maximization problem. The first order 










1 ,  (4.3) 
 
where qt and qc denote the partial derivative of q with respect to t and c respectively. 
 
However, one question arises here: is the farm scale already at its optimal level which 
is yielding the highest land rent for the peasant? Or in other words, is it still possible 
for the peasant to increase his total land rent by adjusting the farm scale in his 
landholding? In accordance with our assumptions 3 and 7, whoever the actual farm 
manager is, he can adjust the land scale without C&N costs through land-leasing or 
farmhand-hiring. 
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Suppose the peasant now divides his landholding into k>0 identical shares and farms 
them separately. It is clear that the amount of his total land rent might vary according 
to the value of k. Thus his problem will become: 
 
 Max 'R =k[pq(
k
h , td, cd)-wftd-cd(1+r)], t>0, c>0,   (4.4) 
where td and cd , respectively, are the amounts of labour input and the monetary value 
of various material input in each of the k shares of his landholding.  
 
With some simple mathematics, we know that, in (4.4), if and only if the production 
function, q, is homogeneous of degree 1 with respect to h, then R=R’ holds for any 
value of k, which means the division of plot has no influence on the value of total land 
rent; otherwise, in a general case, if the production function is not homogeneous of 
degree 1 with respect to h, the peasant will obtain different amounts of total land rent 
when k varies and there must be a value of k where the peasant obtains the highest 
value of the total land rent in his landholding.  
 




h  =h, then k will be equal to
h
h .  
 
We then obtain:  
 
Max 'R = ( )[ , , (1d d f d dh pq h t c w t c r
h
−
− − + )] , h>0, td>0, cd>0. (4.5) 
 
Dividing both sides by h  yields: 
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r-ct)-w, cpq(h, t ddfdd )1( + , h>0, td>0, cd>0,   (4.6) 
 
Note that the term
h
R'  is simply the land rental rate.    
 
So a peasant is only interested in the rental rate and therefore his problem is to 
maximize the rental rate, if he knows the production function, product price, farm 
wage rate, and interest rate. A rational peasant will reason as follows: if I set the rental 
rate as high as possible, then I will get the highest total rent since I have the fixed area 
of landholding and the total rent is just the product of rental rate and the area of my 
landholding.  
 
















































ddfh .  (4.9) 
 





,   (4.10)  
 53












= ,  (4.12) 
where qh denotes the partial derivative of q with respect to h. 
 
By solving this problem, we can obtain the corresponding optimal input vector (h*, t*, 
c*), where h* is the optimal farm scale, t* and c* are the corresponding labor and 
material input for the optimal farm scale; and 
h
R* is the value of the optimal rental 
rate at the price bundle (wf, r, p). At this optimal farm scale, every peasant, no matter 
how many hectares of farmland he owns, obtains the highest total land rent subject to 
the current constraints, while he keeps the labour and material input compensated and 
repaid. 
 
If the land has multiple uses, the peasants can also calculate the highest rental rate for 
each use in the same methodology respectively, compare the values of the rental rate 
and choose the highest one; hence they can also determine into what use the land 
should be put. 
 
4.4 The Empirical Evidence 
 
From the previous sections, we can see that Assumptions 6 and 7, respectively, are 
crucial for our job choice and land rent determination models. If they don’t hold in 
reality, the explanation ability of our models will be weakened heavily. So, in this 
section, we will present empirical evidence to support them. To begin with, we first 
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1) The higher the stock of human capital a peasant owns, the higher the non-farm 
wage he can obtain, and the more time he will spend in non-farm activities.    
 
2) The practical farm scales (as approximation of the optimal farm scales) can vary 
and differ dramatically from the landholding per household through the rental 
activities in rural China, which, in turn, indirectly implies that the transaction 
costs of farm scale adjustment in rural China are low.    
 
The data are mainly obtained and compiled from the Poverty Monitoring Report of 
Rural China 2008 as well as from the empirical researches of some economists and 
scholars in this field (e.g. Tan, Qu, & Heerink , 2003; Huang et al, 2001).  
 
4.4.1 Evidence for Proposition 1 
 
The data in Table 4.1 are calculated from the survey of rural households living in the 
592 State Designated Impoverished Counties in China 2007, investigated by the 
China National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 2008. The size of the sample was 50,000. 
The surveyed population was classified into 4 groups, namely, the farm households, 
the households mainly do farm job, the households mainly do non-farm jobs, and the 
non-farm households. The first row shows the population structure indicating that the 
households who mainly do farm job comprise the majority (50.23%) of the surveyed 
population. The second row shows the relationship between the illiteracy and the job 
choice: the category of non-farm households corresponds to the lowest illiteracy, 
while the category of farm households corresponds to the highest illiteracy. If we take 
the illiteracy of each category as a negative indicator of its respective average stock of 
human capital, then the data show that the higher the stock of human capital a peasant 
owns, the more time he will spend in non-farm activities. Comparing the second row 
with the third row, we can see the relationship between the illiteracy and the non-farm 
wage per capita: the non-farm wage per capita is negatively related to the illiteracy (or  
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in other words, positively related with the stock of human capital).10 Thus Proposition  
1 is empirically supported. Moreover, comparing the second row with the bottom row, 
we can also find that the net income per capita is negatively related with the illiteracy 
too. 
 
Job Choices of Rural Households in the 592 State Designated Impoverished Counties 











Percentage 21.7 50.23 25.93 21.44 
 



































Source: Calculated from the Poverty Monitoring Report of Rural China 2008 of NBS, 
table 4-9, p. 273.  
 
4.4.2 Evidence for Proposition 2 
 
Some Chinese scholars argued that the practical farm scale in China is too small 
compared to other countries, e.g., the USA, Australia, and Israel, and suggested that 
the central government of China should make policies to encourage larger scale  
10However, an increase of a peasant’s stock of human capital does not significantly increase the farm 
wage rate he faces. For details, see Huffman (2001), Yang (1997) & (2002), and Fafchamps & 
Quisumbing (1999). 
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farms.11 They even attributed the “guilt” of the prevailing of small-scale farming in 
China to the HRS, by arguing that, under the HRS the farmlands in every village were 
divided into small pieces and allocated to all villagers in an egalitarian manner which 
made the landholding per capita in every village quite small. Representative remarks 
are as follows:   
 
“The HRS has generally played a very important role in elimination of hunger and 
poverty in rural areas in its early years. However, after 20 years’ implementation 
of the HRS, although the advantages of HRS (such as to stimulate the working 
incentive of farmers) are still playing a role in some poor regions, it now has 
caused many problems which have been gradually exposed in vast areas. The most 
obvious problem is that it has resulted in the land fragmentation and 
corresponding small-scale operation, which renders adversely impact on 
agricultural production and rural development. These problems, since 1980s, have 
caused the attention of Chinese governments, so the state launched a campaign in 
the coastal areas to discourage the small-scale-farm operations, but to encourage
land integration, however the effect is not significant. At present, only 6% of 
arable lands are in large scale farming.” (Tan, et al., 2003, p. 24)12 
 
However, on the other hand, Tan, et al. (2003, p. 24), also noted: “The spontaneous 
land lease activities in rural areas have eased, in some extent, the adverse situation of 
land fragmentation.”13
11 See Tan, Qu, and Heerink (2001), and Huang et al (2001). An ironical paradox is that many 
large-scale state-owned farms have divided their large farmlands into many pieces and, respectively, 
leased them to individual peasants in China. For details see 
http://3c.mmo5.com/sjzz/nongkenju/tongji/201006/t20100606_1536100.htm. 
12 The “large scale” here means the farm scale per capita is equal or greater than 0.67 hectare. The 
quotation is translated from Chinese by the author.  
13 Translated from Chinese by the author.
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What made the government’s efforts to encourage transformation of small-farm scale 
to the ideal large scale to be in vain? According to our theory developed in section 4.3, 
there exists an optimal farming scale for each plot and the equilibrium is determined 
by the specific market farm wage rate, interest rate, the production function, and the 
price of the agricultural products. As the values of these determinants vary, the 
equilibrium or optimal scale will vary correspondingly. From Table 4.1, we can see 
that the average farm scales are also very different in the other countries than China. 
 
The Average Farm Scale in Different Countries of Different Periods 
 
 
Country/Year The average farm scale (unit: hectare) 
India/1960-1961 2.6 
Holland/1950 7.4 
Belgium/1950  7.5 







Source: Adapted from Tan, et al., 2003, table 1, p. 25 
 
Other Chinese economists did empirical research on the production of peasants in 
various rural regions in China. Wang, Kong, and Hu (2008) estimated the wheat 
production function in Anhui province and found that the input of labor and other 
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production factors is very close to an optimal level. Qian & Li (2004) estimated the 
optimal farming scales for ten cereal production provinces and argued that the optimal 
farm scales were larger than the private landholding per household in these provinces. 
Zhong & Wang (2003) did a field survey in Zhejing and Hubei provinces. They found 
among the total sample of the two provinces, 32.6% of the peasants rented out their 
farmland, while 20.7% of the peasants rented farmland of others. Li (2010) did a field 
survey in Dongfangcun, which is a remote mountainous village in Chongqing. Li 
found that 17.48% of the total area of farmland in this village was involved into rental 
activities, while 31.94% of the total households in the village were involved into 
rental activities. Guan (2009) and Su et al. (2009) investigated the rental activities in 
Fengcheng County in Jiangxi Province and Yongchuan region in Chongqing, 
respectively. In both regions, they found the rental activities are prevailing and can 
significantly increase the practical farm scales. For instance, in Fengcheng County, 
about 15.4% of the total farmland was involved into rental activities, among which, 
7.9% was leased to 422 large-scale14 tenants who rented an area of farmland of 
10-200 times of the local landholding per household15 (Guan, 2009, p. 49). In 
Yongchuan region, 84 large-scale16 tenants rented an area of farmland of 18-125 times 







14See Guan (2009, p. 49): the “large scale” in Fengcheng County means the farm scale per capita is 
equal or greater than 3.3 hectare.  
15See Guan (2009, p. 50): the local landholding per household in Fengcheng County is about 0.33 
hectare.  
16See Su et al. (2009, p. 220): the “large scale” in Yongchuan region means the farm scale per capita is 
equal or greater than 3.3 hectare. 
17Estimated from Su et al. (2009, p. 221): the local landholding per household in Yongchuan region is 
about 0.33 hectare.  
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The Landholdings Per Household and the Estimated Optimal Farming Scales in Ten 
Main Cereal Producing Provinces in China                                     
(Unit: hectare) 
Province 
The landholding per 
household(1) 




Hebei 0.36 2.66 7.35 
Liaoning 1.01 5.06 5.03 
Jilin 1.75 7.61 4.36 
Heilongjiang 1.86 8.14 4.39 
Jiangsu 0.26 3.38 13.09 
Anhui 0.51 3.58 7.07 
Shandong 0.32 4.97 15.34 
Henan 0.46 3.42 7.45 
Hubei 0.39 3.50 9.01 
Sichuan 0.23 2.89 12.45 
Average 0.71 4.52 6.33 
 
Table 4.3 
Source: Adapted from Qian and Li (2004, Table 2, p. 42) 
 
Table 4.2 shows the landholding per household, the estimated optimal farming scale 
and the ratio of them. The ratios can be roughly viewed as a measure of different 
transaction conditions in these regions: a higher value of the ratio indicates a higher 
transaction cost to reach the optimal scale. The highest ratio 15.34 happens in 
Shandong province, which is however still moderate18, so we believe the general  
18Compared to the ratios on p. 59 investigated by Guan (2009) and Su et al. (2009), we can safely say it 
is moderate and there should not be much difficulty to integrate peasants’ landholdings and reach the 
optimal farm scale. Moreover, since rental activities usually take place within villages, where the 
peasants know one another and their landholdings are adjacent, the N & C costs are further lowered.     
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transaction costs to achieve the optimal scale from the current landholding situation is 
not high in rural China and therefore can be ignored for our research purpose.  
 
4.4.3 A Case of the Land Rental Activities in L19 Village 
 
Although the above evidences have sufficiently supported our propositions, 
presenting a real case demonstrating the practical behavior of peasants in a small 
village may be still necessary. A Chinese scholar Zhenjie Yang (2006) has done a field 
survey in L village and other two villages in Hubei Province, central China, in 2005. 
Yang’s survey provides useful information about how peasants chose jobs, how land 
rents varied, as well as how the practical farming scale varied before and after an 
abolishment of farming tax and fees in L village. The following are compiled from 
Yang’s survey report.20
 
L Village is located remotely on the border between Wuhan region and Hanchuan 
region. It is a typical agricultural village in the Jianghan Plain in central China, which 
is relatively distant to big cities but favorable in arable conditions. L village mainly 
grows cotton, wheat, rapeseeds, soybeans, sesames, and other cash crops. The 
landholding per household in L Village is about 0.42 hectare.  
 
Yang found, in his survey, that 67% of the surveyed families sent out at least one 
laborer to work outside of the village in a certain non-farm activity for more than 3 
months in 2004. Among these non-farm laborers, Yang observed that young laborers 
(under 30 years old) mainly chose to work in far big cities; the laborers who were 
between 30-40 years old mainly engaged locally in some small trades; the laborers 
who were over the age of 40 mainly chose to farm locally. This was the basic situation
19For some reason, Yang (2005) did not provide the real name of the village.
20The following text of the case is abstracted and translated by the author from Chinese into English. 
For the original text, see http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/ics/21c/supplem/essay/0509103g.htm  
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in L village, and the other two villages were basically the same.21  
 
Before Hubei Province reduced the farming taxes and fees at the end of 2002, 
peasants in L village had to pay a farming tax of 1170 Yuan per hectare per year. Since 
the beginning of 2003, the farming tax was reduced to 1020 Yuan per hectare per year. 
If other relevant fees required were added, the total taxes and fees summed up to 1500 
Yuan per hectare per year. Every household in L village owns only 0.33 to 0.4 
hectares of farmland which yields an average net income between 6000 to 7500 Yuan 
per hectare per year, i.e., the household net income was just a little bit more than 2000 
Yuan before the end of 2002. Thus it was impossible for a farmer to become rich by 
just farming in his own landholding, unless “the farmland is able to grow gold.” 
(peasants’ language)  
 
In such a situation, a lot of farmers preferred to do other work than to farm in the 
village. However, under the HRS, it is obligatory for the peasants to act as a 
contractor, to pay the farming tax and fees independently of whether they farm or not. 
Fortunately, there were some so called staying-farmers who began to “help” the 
out-going farmers to farm their landholdings by various relationships- relative 
relationship, neighborhood, friendship, etc. They promised the out-going farmers that 
they would be responsible for paying the farming tax and fees for the out-going 
farmers. At the end of a year they would give the out-going farmers some harvest in 
kind rather than in cash– usually a certain amount of cotton or a few bundles of cotton 
stalk (fuel) in return, which generally was not worth much and then is decided 
arbitrarily by the out-going farmers. Even, for many out-going farmers, as long as the 
“helpers” agreed to pay farming tax and fees for them, they would allow the “helpers” 
to farm their landholdings since the net land rent is trivial after the deduction of the 
farming tax and fees.  
 
 
21Therefore, we only focus on L village. 
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The “helping” activities sharply dropped the farm labor force with a large number of 
peasants in L village going out to cities for better income. However, to the staying 
farmers, it meant that per capita arable land area increased, the stress between labor 
and land to some extent was eased, and larger scale became possible. The survey 
showed: nearly 55% of the surveyed staying farmers farmed the landholdings of 
out-going farmers in 2003. Note that for the “helpers”, “to farm as much area as 
possible” became their optimal strategy and choice, since on the one hand, they could 
take full advantage of their labour, on the other hand, they could at least share parts of 
the land rents of the out-going farmers’ landholdings if the out-going farmers gave up 
all or some land rents of their landholdings. For instance, there were some households 
who grew cotton even in the scale of 2 hectares (Growing cotton is very labor 
intensive; the laborers required for this scale was beyond the maximum number of 
laborers that a household can provide in L village; an explanation is that they might 
have hired farmhands to farm the excessive area and then, after paying the farmhands 
the prevailing farm wage, they could obtain the land rent from the excessive area).  
 
However, in 2004, Wuhan region and Hanchuan region abolished completely the 
farming tax and fees. Since 2005, an interesting phenomenon turned up - 26.5% of the 
surveyed farmers began to rent rather than “help” in farming the out-going farmers’ 
landholdings, and the rental rate ranged from 900 to 2250 Yuan per hectare 
(depending on arable conditions of the plots and the degree of intimacy between the 
contracted parties).  
 
Many of the landholdings formerly contracted in helping manner were taken back by 
their owners; the highest rental rate per hectare of 2250 Yuan is even much higher 
than the original farming taxes. It is quite evident that the change from the helping 
manner to the manner of charging rent is due to the abolishment of farming taxes and 
fees. In consistent with the abolishment of farming tax and fees, the practical farm 
scale in L village per household was switched to 1.07 hectare, which is still about 
three times of the landholding per household.   
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Remarks: this case first shows that the practical farm scales are affected by the land 
rent consideration of peasants. When land rent is trivial, the landowners may not care 
and count their land rents seriously so that their landholdings can be cultivated in the 
“helping” manner; when land rents are significantly increased, the landowners begin 
to calculate and charge rent seriously, which also caused the practical farm scales in L 
village to vary and approach towards the optimal farm scales. Additional, this case 
also shows that the practical farming scale is indeed much bigger than the farmland 
holding per household; the small farmland holding per household does not much 
matter for the farming scale increasing. As shown in this case, the practical farming 




In this chapter, we first analyzed the job choice problem of peasants and concluded 
that the level of a peasant’s best non-farm wage rate and the level of the prevailing 
farm wage rate determine the peasant’s job choice between farm and non-farm jobs; 
peasants who leave their villages and choose to do non-farm jobs in cities can obtain 
the rents from their landholdings as landowners by rental activities, hiring farmhands, 
and so on. Then, we conclude, from our land-rent-determination model, that there 
exists an equilibrium (or optimal) farm scale for each landholding, which is 
determined by the behavior of land-rent maximization of the peasants as landowners. 
Next, we empirically showed that the peasants who mainly do farm jobs are poorer 
and have higher illiteracy (or lower average stock of human capital) than those who 
mainly do non-farm jobs. Finally the evidence from various sources implies that on 
the one hand, the small-scale farm in China may be due to the behavior of 
land-rent-maximization of peasants; on the other hand, rental activities indeed play an 
important role to improve the practical farming scales.    
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Chapter 5 
 
The Human Capital Accumulation  
 
5.1 Introduction
Adam Smith might be the first economist who recognized and emphasized the crucial 
role of the acquisition of productive human talents for the economic progress by 
defining it as one of his four types of fixed capital in his masterpiece “The Wealth of 
Nations”. The four types in order were: 1) useful machines and instruments of the 
trade, 2) buildings as the means of procuring revenue, 3) improvements of land, and 4) 
human capital22. With respect to the human capital, Smith (1976, p. 283) argued: 
“The acquisition of such talents, by the maintenance of the acquirer during his 
education, study, or apprenticeship, always costs a real expense, which is a capital 
fixed and realized, as it were, in his person. Those talents, as they make a part of 
his fortune, so do they likewise that of the society to which he belongs. The 
improved dexterity of a workman may be considered in the same light as a 
machine or instrument of trade which facilitates and abridges labor, and which, 
though it costs a certain expense, repays that expense with a profit.”  
Furthermore, Smith (1976, p.14) argued that human capital and the productive power 
of labor both depended on the division of labor by stating: 
 
“The greatest improvement in the productive powers of labor, and the greater part 
of the skill and judgment with which it is any where directed or applied, seem to 
have been the effects of the division of labor.” 
 
22 Adam Smith (1976, pp. 282-283) did not use the term “human capital” but actually meant it from the 
context in his work.  
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The attention on human capital in the modern literature dates back to the 1960s, when 
the term was used by the Nobel Prize winner Theodore Schultz. Schultz (1958) 
initially thought over the question why post-World-War-II Germany and Japan 
recovered at almost miraculous speed from the wide-spread devastation. He found the 
reason might be that there were healthy and highly educated populations in the two 
countries and he then called this qualitative aspect of economics “human capital”. 
Schultz later defined in “Investment in People”: 
 
“Consider all human abilities to be either innate or acquired. Every person is born 
with a particular set of genes, which determines his innate ability…. Attributes of 
acquired population quality, which are valuable and can be augmented by 
appropriate investment, will be treated as human capital” (1981, p. 21). 
 
Moreover, Schultz (1961, p.16) claimed: “The most distinctive feature of our 
economic system is the growth in human capital. Without it there would be only hard, 
manual work and poverty except for those who have income from property” and that 
improving the welfare of poor people did not depend on land, equipment or energy 
but rather on the accumulation of human capital (1979, p. 640).23  
Another Nobel Prize winner, Gary Becker (1993), also studied human capital in his 
works. His book, entitled “Human Capital” and initially published in 1964, later 
gradually became a standard reference in this field. In Becker’s view, human capital is 
similar to the physical means of production (factories, machines, and so on); one can 
invest in human capital via education, training, health care, on-the-job learning, and 
so on; and human capital is a means of production, into which an additional 
investment yields an additional output.  
 
23We will argue later that the improvement of one’s human capital is still constrained by one’s life time 
physical assets (the sum of personal lifetime non-earning incomes) in market-oriented economies.  
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We argue here that human capital in fact can either refer to the overall status of 
distribution of knowledge, ability and health among the population in a country or a 
region, which can be used in macro analysis, or refer to the combined earning 
capability embodied in an individual, which can be used in behavior analysis. In this 
paper, unless otherwise indicated, human capital refers to the combined earning 
capability embodied in an individual, namely in the micro sense.  
 
Although many scholars ( e.g., Shultz, 1961; Becker, 1993) used to employ the jargon 
of human capital investment to describe the accumulation process of human capital, 
we have to point out in this dissertation that at least at an individual level, it is 
essentially a kind of consumption behavior rather than investment behavior since 
one’s preference plays a significant role in the process of making a decision on human 
capital accumulation: An individual, when facing a decision on education and training, 
may prefer a certain major, program, or pathway to others with an identical or even 
superior expected rate of return; for example, even if knowing the fact that a lawyer 
can earn much more than a pastor in one’s lifetime, a high school graduate who 
receives two letters of admission from a first-class university (assume that one is from 
a divine school, the other is from a school of laws, and the tuition fees for both 
schools are the same ) may choose to go to the divine school other than the school of 
laws. The reason might be that he prefers the “holy” career of a pastor to the “plain” 
one of a lawyer. By contrast, an individual rarely prefers a project of physical capital 
investment to others with an identical or superior rate of return.  For instance, if the 24
rate of return on investment in a highway project is higher than that in a railway 




24If preference plays a significant role in the decision on physical-capital investments, then the 
physical-capital investments should also be taken as a kind of consumption behavior.    
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Moreover, there are some other properties of human capital, which differ from those 
of physical capital:  
 
1) One can acquire (grant) an ownership of physical capital from (to) to other 
persons immediately, while one can not acquire an ownership of human capital in 
this way. To obtain human capital, one must spend one’s own time and effort in 
the activities of learning, practice, and so on. 
 
2) Human capital is innovative and creative, while physical capital is not. Using 
human capital one can create and invent new things, while using physical capital 
one produces only old things. 
 
3) The level, type, and distribution of human capital indicate the development level 
of science and technology of a country, while those of physical capital show the 
amounts and using statuses of various resources as well as the corresponding 
industrial structure of a country.  
 
4) Human capital brings in profits, while physical capital brings in interests. We 
argue in this dissertation that profits are actually the rewards for entrepreneurship 
that belong to a type of human capital other than a type of physical capital. Given 
the same amount of initial monetary funds, different businessmen may choose 
different projects, take different risks, use different strategies, and finally obtain 
different profits. We should attribute the profit difference to the human-capital 
difference of these businessmen rather than the physical-capital difference. One 
might argue here that the stock dividends are a kind of profit of physical capital. 
This, however, is just illusion. To earn profits in stock markets, one needs to 
master the stock-investment knowledge, practice the stock-investment skills, pay 
attention to the ups and downs of various indices of the stock markets, and so on. 
Different people may obtain different dividends, even if they invest the same 
amount of money in the stock markets. The dividend difference should also be 
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attributed to the difference in their respective knowledge on stock markets, skills 
on stock investment, attention, luck, and so on, which should also belong to 
human capital. 
 
Becker (1993, p. 21) himself also admits that “fortunately, nothing in the concept of 
human capital implies that monetary incentives need be more important than culture 
and non-monetary ones” and “it is much easier to quantify the monetary side”. We 
therefore use the term human capital accumulation instead of the widely used 
expression “human capital investment”. We argue that human capital accumulation is 
the consumption process of human capital goods over time. To avoid confusion, we 
define the word “commodities” as the things can be bought and sold in markets, while 
the word “goods” will be used for the things produced with the input of one’s own 
time and market commodities. Moreover, we will divide commodities (and goods) 
into two groups, say, ordinary commodities (and goods) and human capital 
commodities (and goods). The consumption of ordinary goods does not raise the 
earning capacity, while the consumption of human capital goods does.  
 
The human capital commodities refer to education, training, health care, etc. Human 
capital accumulation therefore consists of the following aspects: 1) Time and 
monetary expenditure in formal and informal education and training programs both in 
the general and the professional aspects; 2)Time and monetary expenditure in 
on-the-job learning: When an individual is engaged in a particular job, he usually can 
increase his skills and productivity by continuously concentrating on the job; 3)Time 
and monetary expenditure in health care: The expenditure in health care can enhance 
people’s earning ability by improving people’s health status and life expectancy, 
which in turn increases the periods of time of collecting income resulting from 
increased human capital (Becker,1993, p. 11).  
 
Generally, a person’s educational level is the most important indicator for his stock of 
human capital; and the education level has been widely used to measure the level of 
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human capital in various empirical research, especially cases where other indicators 
are not available or hard to obtain (Mincer, 1958; Johnson, 1970; Hansen, 1963; 
Rahm, 1971).    
 
5.2 The Basic Model 
 
Assume that a peasant is certain that he will live n periods. His utility depends on his 
decision of consumption over time of objects of choice called goods, as in  
 
U=U(Ci,Hi…Cn,Hn, L ),   (5.1)                  
 
where Ci denotes the amount of ordinary goods, while Hi denotes the amount of 
human capital goods consumed in period i, respectively; L is the inheritance left over 
to his offspring by him when he passes away. We assume people can improve their 
productive skills and hence increase their combined earning ability by consuming the 
human capital good, which in turn will increase their best wage rates.  
 
Furthermore, we assume that U is concave in Ci, Hi, and L, i=1 …n.  
 
Following Becker (1993, p. 70)25, we assume that Ci and Hi are produced with input 
of the market commodities and the peasant’s own time. Let the amounts of ordinary 
commodities and the combined time used be xci and tci , while the amounts of human 
capital commodities and its combined time be xei and tei in period i respectively. Then, 
we have 
 
Ci=fi(xci,tci),i=1,…n,  (5.2)  
and Hi=Ψi(xei,tei),i=1,…n, (5.3)      
25Our construction draws heavily on Becker’s (1993). The main difference is that our approach 
incorporates human capital goods into the preferences and then into the utility function of individuals.  
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Assume that fi is concave in xci and tci, whileΨi is concave in xei and tei. We then 
assume that time can be allocated among consumption of ordinary commodities, 
consumption of human capital commodities and labour force participation. Therefore, 
the following identity holds in each period 
 
tci+twi+tei=t, i=1,…n,  (5.4)                 
 
where twi is the amount of working time in the ith period, and t, the total time available 
during period i, is independent of i if all periods are equally long. 
 
Next, we assume,  
 
Ei+1=Ei+Hi+kitwi-diEi, i=1,…,n, (5.5)                 
 
where Ei+1 is the stock of human capital at the beginning of the i+1th period, and 
0<di<1 is the depreciation rate during period i; 0<ki<1 is the coefficient that 
measures the effect of on-the-job learning during period i.  
 
The earning in each period is affected by the hours spent at work, which is a decision 
variable. We denote the income derived in period i by vi+witwi, where vi is the sum of 
property income and transfer income, while wi is the best wage rate and the product 
witwi is the earning26. Suppose the market interest rate is r, and the same in each 
period.  
 
26Although the word, “earning” has different meanings in different contexts in English, we strictly 
define it, in this dissertation, as the after-tax income obtained in markets as the rewards of using one’s 
manual and mental labour. Because using one’s entrepreneurship is also a form of using one’s mental 
and manual labour, one’s “wage”, defined here as an equivalent term of “earning” in this dissertation, 
will include the income from using one’s entrepreneurship. The non-earning income, therefore, refers 
to the sum of property income and transfer income. 
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Thus a constraint on commodities that complements the constraint on time given by 
(5.4) is that the present value of expenditures on commodities must equal the present 
value of incomes.  
 
1 1
1 1(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
n n
ci ci ei ei i wi i
i n
i i
p x p x w t vL
r r− −= =
+ +
+ =
+ + +∑ ∑ ir ,  (5.6)     
where pci and pei are the prices of ordinary goods and human capital goods, 
respectively. 
 
Note that the inheritance one inherits from one’s parents is included in one’s lifetime 
budget as v1 on the right hand side of (5.6). Substituting for twi from equation (5.4) 
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and ;   i=1, …n   (5.7) 0,0 >≤≤ cici xtt 0,0 ≥≤≤ xtt
 
Note that the right-hand side of (5.6) is the personal lifetime income of an individual, 








∑  as the personal lifetime 











 as the personal lifetime funds (PLF). 
We also restrict the “funds” as an equivalent notion to the non-earning incomes in this 
dissertation.  
                                                                    
Each individual is assumed to maximize his utility given by equation (5.1) subject to 
the constraints given by (5.7), and the production functions given by (5.2) and (5.3). 
For convenience, we presently assume that the optimal values of the variables xci, xei,  
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tci, tei, and L are in the interior of the regions given by (5.7), 27 and the best wage rate 
wi is a function of human capital Ei in the form of    
 
wi=αEi, α>0,  (5.8)  
 
where α is a transformation coefficient which is determined by the specific measure of 
human capital. 
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,   (5.13) 
 
 27If the optimal values of these variables are not in the interior of the regions given by (5.7), we can 
still find the optimal values by comparing all possible boundary solutions and selecting the one 
corresponding to the maximum utility. In reality, it is possible that the optimal values are boundary 
solutions, for a detailed discussion, see p. 74. 
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andλ  is the Lagrangian multiplier equal to the marginal utility of wealth.  
 
The above lifetime utility maximization problem probably has boundary solutions in 
reality. For instance, when an individual is in his childhood and juvenile period, he 
might spend all his time in consumption and not work, because, on the one hand, 
during this period of time, his stock of human capital is so small that there are no 
available jobs for him in the labour markets, on the other hand, it is also in his interest 
to spend much time in this period in the consumption of human capital goods, since 
the earlier stock of human capital causes longer income-collecting periods which in 
turn results in higher life-time earning. Although many individuals still maintain a 
certain stock of human capital when they reach the retirement age, they might have no 
comparative advantages over their younger competitors since the latter with the same 
level of human capital can provide more reliable service than the former and the need 
for spending much time in health care in the retirement period will squeeze out their 
available working time and reduce their working incentive. Moreover, the prevailing 
pension programs greatly encourage them to retire. Thus, most old people will choose 
to spend all of the time in the retirement period in consumption. However, the 
existence of boundary solutions doesn’t affect the implications and conclusions of our 
model in general.  
 
Note that the term 1
1
(
(1 ) (1 )
n










+ +∑ 1 )t∂  measures the shadow price of an 
















+ +∑ 1 )x∂  is the shadow price of an additional unit of 
the composite human capital commodity in the ith period.  
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If all relevant coefficients of the utility maximization problem are given, we can work 
out the solutions. Thus, we will know a peasant’s lifetime wage profile, the present 
value of lifetime streams of earning and income, as well as the distribution of his 
lifetime consumption, etc.  
 
From the above analysis, we know that a person’s lifetime wealth (present value of 
various earnings and non-earning incomes) is determined by his lifetime utility 
function, the market prices of human capital and ordinary commodities, the 
transformation coefficient (or function) between the best wage rates and stocks of 
human capital, the human capital accumulation function, lifetime n, time period 












where E1 is the initial human capital endowment that the human capital accumulation 











 is the present value of the lifetime steam of property 
incomes and net subsidies, or in other words, the present value of personal lifetime 
funds (PLF) privately owned by him.  
 
The above discussion assumes a perfect capital market; that is, any individual can 
finance his lifetime consumption both in ordinary goods and human capital goods by 
borrowing against his future earnings at the normal market interest rate (or lending 
any unused income at the same rate). 
 
Under the perfect capital market assumption, we can conclude that: 
 
1) Ceteris paribus, the different holdings of personal non-human capital or PLF 
explain the differences in the lifetime earning and lifetime income among 
individuals.  
 
2) The personal lifetime earning (PLE) is negatively related to the interest rate one 
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faces. Thus, ceteris paribus, a decrease in the interest rate will increase the PLEs 
of individuals. 
 
3) The personal lifetime earning and income are negatively related to the prices of 
goods of all kinds. Ceteris paribus, a decrease in prices of goods will increase the 
lifetime earning and income of individuals. 
 
4) The PLE is positively related to the best wage rate, which in turn is positively 
related with the time and money spent in accumulation of personal human capital. 
 
5) The quantity of PLF affects the accumulation of human capital, which in turn 
affects the personal lifetime earning and income. We argue that under the perfect 
capital market assumption, there exists a level of PLF at which the maximally 
possible PLE for an individual can be derived. One might argue that the PLF is 
not a choice variable for individuals; but it is a choice variable for a social planner 
(or a central government), since the social planner can adjust PLF by using a 
tax-subsidy system. For instance, the PLF of a poor person will increase if the 
government increase his share of subsidies, while that of a rich person will 
decrease if the government increase his share of taxes. Intuitively, in the case 
one’s PLF are lower than the amount maximizing one’s PLE, one may spend quite 
a lot of time working, but the value of one’s PLE as the integral of the lifetime 
working time in terms of one’s best wage rates will be lower than the maximally 
possible value, because one may not be able to accumulate a sufficient stock of 
human capital; while in the case one’s amount of PLF is higher than the one 
maximizing PLE, one’s stock of human capital is high, but one may just spend 
little time working due to the fact one can live “happily” with a large amount of 
non-earning income, which consequently causes one’s PLE to be lower than the 
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5.3 An Extension to the Case of an Imperfect Capital Market  
 
The budget constraints in the last section imply that a peasant can borrow money 
against future earnings at the market interest rate. But this is obviously far away from 
the real situation poor peasants face. Generally, the stream of future earnings is not a 
sound collateral, especially in less developed economies, where it often can not be 
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, is the amount of one’s 
PLF, which can be taken as a perfect collateral, xci>0, xei>0, tw≥0. These budget 
constraints must be jointly satisfied. 
 
Then, the first order optimality conditions under the imperfect capital market 














 i=1,…n,  (5.15) 
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Note the equality , m=1,…n, holds for all the above conditions, where (1 )n mm n rλ λ
−= +
mλ  stands for the marginal utility of money in the m
th period in ones lifetime. 
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where, 






− .                                                  
 
Since , if r>0, in the case of an imperfect capital market, the shadow price of 
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and the shadow price of an additional unit of time that would be used in producing the 
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are actually higher than in the case of a perfect market, especially in the early periods 
of one’s lifetime, ceteris paribus, which will heavily decrease both the extent of 




From the above analysis, we argue that both in the perfect capital market and the 
imperfect capital market, the PLE and personal lifetime income are determined by the 
PLF one owns. Due to the fact the future earnings cannot be taken as sound collateral 
to raise loans in the less-developed economies, the situation of the people owning 
little PLF becomes quite disadvantageous. Therefore, unless poor people can obtain 
sufficient PLF, it is unlikely for the majority of them with average luck to become rich 
just by hard work. Because, on the one hand, the low-wage-rate jobs they are usually 
engaged in have little effect in the human capital accumulation; on the other hand, the 
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However, the individuals owning much PLF may sell little (the very rich may not 
have to work at all) own labour in the labour market and create little PLE, although 
they might also accumulate a considerable stock of human capital. Extracting 
non-earning income tax from them and allocating more subsidies to the poor will 
increase the aggregate earning of an economy, because the poor can then sell 
higher-value labour in the labour market with a looser budget constraint, while the 
rich have to sell more of their labour with a stricter budget constraint. Thus, the 
society will develop faster due to the fact that efforts of more people are contributed.  
 
 80
The Rural-Urban Migration 
Chapter 6 
 
The Rural-Urban Migration  
 
In the literature, there are quite a few articles on the topic of rural-urban migration in 
developing countries (e.g., see Banister & Taylor, 1990; Barham & Boucher, 1998; 
Davin, 1999). However, among them, the most influential works have been the ones 
of Todaro (1969) and Harris-Todaro (1970). In the former work, Todaro considered 
the rural-urban migration that occurs as a result of the expected income difference, i.e., 
the real income difference adjusted for the probability of finding an urban job, 
between urban and rural areas rather than the real income difference; The probability 
of finding an urban job is defined to be equal to the ratio of new job openings relative 
to the number of workers in the urban unemployment and underemployment pool 
(UUUP ), which is also called the urban traditional sector in Todaro’s work. In the 
latter work, the authors formulated a two-sector model to further discuss the migration 
equilibria for various cases. Because our following work shares only a little similarity 
in the modeling with their works, it is helpful to elaborate the two important models 
first. The advantage of this arrangement is that one can make a clear comparison, 
which in turn, we hope, helps to form a comprehensive understanding of the 
rural-urban migration problem. The following two sections, 6.1 and 6.2, therefore, 
restate the main points of two important works respectively.  
 
6.1 A Review of Todaro’s Work   
 
Todaro’s assumptions are as follows: 
 
1) The percentage change in the urban labour force is a function of the difference 
between the present values of expected urban and rural real income divided by the 
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present value of expected rural real income- i.e., 
 










0F ′ > ,  (6.1) 
 
where, 
M& is the size of net rural-urban migration; 
M is the size of labour force in the urban sector; 
( )uI t is the present value of the expected urban real income over a certain 
planning period of a worker; and  
( )rI t  denotes the present value of the expected rural real income over the same 
planning period of a worker. 
 
 2) For each worker, the planning period is the same. 
 
3) The migration costs are fixed and identical for all workers. 
 
4) There is a constant discount factor r over the planning period, which is the same 
for all workers. 






I R t e dt−
=
= ∫ , (6.2) 
 
where, ( )rR t denotes the net expected rural real income in period t and r is the 
discounting factor. 
 
For , (6.3) holds: (0)uI
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   ,   (6.3) 
0
(0) ( ) ( ) (0)
n rt
u ut
I t R t e dtν −
=
= −∫ K
    
where, ( )uR t represents the expected urban real income in period t, K(0) denotes 
the migration costs, and ν (t) is the probability of having a modern sector job in 
period t. 
 
Note that in equation (6.3), the expected income in any period t varies directly with 
ν (t). Thus the modeling allows for the case that the rural-urban real income 
difference, ( )uR t - ( )rR t is positive while the term ( ) ( )ut R tν - ( )rR t  is negative.    
 
Then, let ϖ (t) be the probability of being selected from the UUUP and then having a 
modern sector job in period t if the worker is a member of that pool in period t.  
 
It follows that: 
 
ν (0)=ϖ (0) 
 
and     
     
ν (1)=ϖ (0)+(1-ϖ (0))ϖ (1),   
   
that is, the probability of having a modern sector job in period zero equals the 
probability of being immediately selected from this UUUP pool, while the probability 
of having a modern sector job in period 1 equals the probability of being selected in 
period zero plus the probability of being selected in period 1. To generalize, it holds 
for any period, t,     
 
      ν (t)= ν (t-1)+(1-ν (t-1))ϖ (t) 
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Next, Todaro defined ϖ (t) to be equal to the ratio of the number of vacant modern 
sector jobs in period t relative to the number of unemployed workers in the UUUP at 
time t. Todaro further assumed that the number of new jobs created in the modern 
sector increases at a constant exponential rate over time. Specifically,  
 
( )( ) (0) tN t N e η λ− −= , (6.5) 
 
where 
N(t) denotes the number of modern sector jobs in period t, 
η denotes the growth rate of output in the modern sector, and 
λ is the growth rate of labour productivity in the modern sector. 
 
Thus, if we denote the job creating rate byδ =η -λ , (6.6) will hold, 
 
( )( )
( ) ( )
N tt
M t N t
δϖ =
−
.  (6.6) 
 
Therefore, we can represent the size of the UUUP by M(t)-N(t). Assume the labour 
demand equation is: 
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( )( ) (0) tN t N e η λ− −= ,  (6.7) 
 








Next, for simplicity, if we assume the migration planning is only for one period, the 
corresponding aggregate labour supply equation is: 
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( ) ( ) ( ( ))M t t F
M
α ϖ β= +
&
t ,  (6.8a) 
 
where 
α  is the natural increasing rate of the urban labour force, 
( )tβ is the percentage difference between the urban and rural expected real 
income, and  




Thus, the increasing rate of urban labour force caused by migration is measured 
by ( ) ( ( ))t F tϖ β , or, in other words, migration varies directly with the probability of 
finding a modern sector job.  
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Substituting from the equation (6.6) for ( )tϖ into (6.8) yields: 
 
( )( ) ( ( ))
( ) ( )
M N tt F




t .  (6.9) 
 
Assume the income difference does not change over time, i.e., ( )tβ = β . 
 
Finally, represent the proportion of urban labour force employed in the modern sector 






= .  (6.10) 
 
The equilibrium condition for Todaro’s model is defined simply as that employment 





equals zero, i.e.: 
 






Now from equations (6.7a) and (6.9), we can obtain the following equation:  
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.  (6.11) 
 
From (6.11) we can easily obtain: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
F N t
M t N t
δ βδ α− =
−
.  (6.12) 
Dividing both numerator and dominator of the right-side term by M(t) and substituting 
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δ βδ α− =
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.   (6.14) 
 







δ β δ α
−
= − = −
+ −
.  (6.15) 
 
Equation (6.15) indicates that T* will vary positively with the percentage difference of 







), and negatively with 







). Moreover, if the growth rate of modern sector output 
(λ ) increases, which in turn increases the growth rate of modern sector employment 
opportunity (δ ), the proportionate size of the UUUP, , may not decrease since the 
urban real wage difference (
*T
β ) may also increases by a certain amount which can 
offset the impact on of that*T λ increases.  
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6.2 A Review of the Harris-Todaro Model 
 
In Harris-Todaro model, there are two sectors: the urban and rural sectors. The urban 
sector produces a manufactured good, part of which is sold to the rural sector to buy 
agricultural goods. The rural sector can choose between either taking advantage of  
all available labour to produce an agricultural good, part of which is sold to the urban 
sector, or using only part of its labour to produce this good while selling the 




1) A typical migrant worker keeps his connection with the rural sector and, therefore, 
the income that he earns as an urban worker will be counted as a part of the rural 
sector income. 
 
2) The rural-urban migration will go on as long as the expected urban real income is 
higher than the expected real agricultural income.  
 
3) The total urban labour force includes all permanent urban workers and the migrant 
workers.  
 
4) From the total urban labour force, a random worker selection process exists 
whenever the number of job seekers is greater than the number of available jobs.  
 
5) The expected urban wage is equal to the product of a fixed minimum urban wage 
and the proportion of the urban labour force employed.  
 
6) There exists perfectly competitive behavior on the producers of both sectors and 
the price of the agricultural good (measured by manufactured goods) is determined by 
the supply of agricultural good relative to the supply of urban good in the market. 
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The model now can be formulated as follows:  
The agricultural production function: 
 
YA = s(NA, F, KA ),s ' > 0, s" < 0,  (6.16) 
 
where, 
YA represents output of the agricultural good, NA represents the rural labour used to 
produce this output, F represents the total area of farmland in the rural sector, KA 
represents the fixed amount of capital stock in the rural sector, s', s" are respectively 
the first and second derivatives of s with respect to NA. 
 
The manufacturing production function: 
 
 YM=g(NM, KM), g' > 0, g" < 0,  (6.17) 
 
where YM represents the output of the manufactured good, NM represents the total 
labour required to produce this output. KM is the fixed capital stock, and g' and g" are 
respectively the first and second derivatives of g with respect to NM.  
 






ρ= ) ,    (6.18) 
 
where p represents the price of the agricultural good measured by the manufactured 
good. 
 
The agricultural real wage determination: 
 
WA = ps',    (6.19) 
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where WA represents the agricultural real wage, which is equal to the value of labour’s 
marginal product in agriculture measured by the manufactured good.  
 
The manufacturing real wage: 
 
WM=g’ MW≥ .   (6.20) 
 
Note that in the Harris-Todaro model, the real wage in manufacturing, measured by 
manufactured goods, is restricted to be greater than or equal to the fixed minimum 
urban wage and the Harris-Todaro model considers only cases in which g'= MW . 
 















  (6.21) 
 
where represents the expected real wage in the urban sector, which is equal to the 
real minimum wage 
e
uW





. Note only in the case of full employment in the urban sector (MM = 
Mu), the expected wage is equal to the minimum wage (i.e., = euW MW ). 
 
The labour endowment: 
 
NA + Nu = u MN N N+ = . (6.22) 
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The labour constraint is that the sum of workers actually employed in the agricultural 
sector (NA) and the total urban labour force (Nu) must be equal to the sum of initial 
endowments of rural ( uN ) and urban labour ( MN ), which is the total labour 
endowment( N ). 
 
The equilibrium condition: 
 
e
A uW W= .   (6.23) 
 
(6.23) is the equilibrium condition, which is based on the hypothesis that migration to 
the urban area is a positive function of the expected wage difference between the 





ξ= −& ')ps , (6.24) 
 
' 0, (0) 0ξ ξ> = ,                                                   
 
where , represents a time derivative. It is clear that migration will stop only when 
the expected income difference is zero.  
uN&
 
Now we have 8 equations in 8 unknowns YA, YM, NA, NM, WA, , NeuW u, and p. Given 
the production functions and fixed minimum wage MW , we can calculate the values of 
the sectoral employment, the equilibrium unemployment rate, the equilibrium 
expected wage, relative output levels, and so on.  
 
We now analyze how an unemployment equilibrium comes about.  
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In equilibrium, 
/   M M uW N N ps= '  and migration stops. From (6.20) one knows that in the 
competitive urban manufacturing sector, WM=g', from equation (6.22) that 
  NA uN N− = and from equation (6.18) that ( )  M Ap Y Yρ= . 
 
Therefore, the equilibrium condition can be transformed into 
 
'( ) ' MM A
A




=0.  (6.25) 
 
Because YM and YA respectively are functions of NM and NA, is an implicit function 
in N
Φ
A and NM, which can be solved for any given minimum wage. We can also 
calculate the values of the urban unemployment and commodity outputs from the 
equilibrium condition.  
 
There is a unique equilibrium that corresponds to each possible value of the minimum 
wage, and the locus of these equilibria is shown in Figure 6.1 as the line =0 in the 
N
Φ
A, NM space. Note that the line A MN N N+ = in Figure 6.1 denotes the locus of full 
employment points. 
 
In Figure 6.1, the only equilibrium of full employment is at the point Z, at which *MN  
workers are employed in the urban sector and *AN  in the rural sector. On the 
locusΦ =0, the points to the east of Z are infeasible, while points to the west of Z are 
correspondent to the minimum wages that are higher than the full-employment wage. 
Note that the higher minimum wages correspond to those points on =0 locating 
farther to the west. The point H in Figure 6.1 can be used to explain the situation if a 
minimum wage is set above the market-clearing level. At point H, N'
Φ
A workers are 
employed in the rural sector, N'M in the urban sector, and workers are 'uN N− M
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unemployed. Thus, if the minimum wage is set higher than the market-clearing level, 
there will be a loss of employment and output in both sectors. 
 
The Geometrical Demonstration of the Equilibrium  
of Rural-Urban Migration in the Harris-Todaro Model 
 
Figure 6.1 
Source: Harris & Todaro, fig.1, p. 130 
 
With a similar reasoning, we can also analyze the case that the minimum wage is 







= ≥ .  (6.20’)  
 
Substituting (6.20), (6.21’), and (6.22) into (6.24) yields the equilibrium condition: 
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= .   (6.26) 
 
Imagine that the initial situation of an economy is at a point on the production 










<  holds.  
 
At that point, the equilibrium point will also be achieved through an increasing of ps' 
and decreasing of  in response to migration. As the relative agricultural output 
decreases, p will increase. This in turn will also cause the output of the manufactured 
good to decrease, because the producers will produce at the point where
e
uW
' Mg W p= , 
which increases with the manufactured good. 
 
Note that g' can be increased only through output restriction (since g" <0). Therefore, 
imposing a minimum wage will lead to an equilibrium with unemployment and loss 
of potential output of both agricultural and manufactured goods. A new locusΦ =0 
will be defined in Figure 6.1 such that the point on 
′
Φ′ corresponding to any given 
minimum wage will be on the west side of the corresponding point onΦ . Thus, in the 
case that the minimum wage is fixed in terms of the agricultural good, the equilibrium 
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6.3 Remarks on the Above Models 
 
There are some drawbacks commonly exist in both models: 
 
1) They both treat the individual rural-urban migration as a two-choice problem: a 
potential migrant simply chooses between either to stay in rural areas or to 
migrate to urban areas and live and work there permanently. However, lots of 
evidence shows that the intermediate choice is preferred by many migrants (e.g., 
He, Yuan, & Song, 2010; Meng, 2010). Many peasants in China choose neither to 
work and live in the rural areas permanently nor to work and live in the urban 
areas permanently; alternatively, they prefer to work and live in the urban areas 
for some periods and to work and live in the rural areas for the other periods of 
their lifetime.   
 
2) The probability of obtaining an urban job for an individual mainly depends on the 
type and extent of the specific human capital he owns rather than his duration in 
urban areas or the overall ratio of M uN N . For example, the probability of 
obtaining a certain urban job for an illiterate migrant who has no professional 
certificate is dramatically lower than for the migrant with an appropriate 
certificate for this job. However, in the above two models, all individuals are 
assumed to face the same employment probability despite the fact that they may 
own different types and stocks of human capital. 
 
3) The rural and urban real incomes might not be easily calculated and compared 
since the rural prices bundle usually is quite different from the urban one in 
developing countries. For example, in China, housing is relatively cheaper in 
rural areas than in urban areas; while the industrial products of the same quality 
are relatively more expensive in rural areas than in urban areas.  
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Moreover, people can easily acquire information on job offers via internet and other 
channels now; it seems no more necessary for a potential migrant to stay in the UUUP 
to wait for the local job offers there. Instead, he can always accept any currently 
available job somewhere while waiting for possible better offers in other places.  
 
6.4 Our Model 
 
It is a well-known fact of economic history that material progress usually has been 
associated with a gradual but continuous transfer of economic agents from rural based 
traditional agriculture to urban-oriented modern industries. An implicit assumption of 
typical labour transfer models is that any migrant who enters the modern sector will 
be gradually absorbed into the gainfully employed. However, an important question 
arises here: is it really possible that urban companies are willing to hire those 
unskilled migrant workers, when there are many skilled job candidates simultaneously 
available in the labour market? In fact, the urban companies usually will shortlist the 
applicants and just select the satisfactory persons among them. Usually, the 
approaches of short-listing, to some extent, can reveal the stocks of human capital of 
the applicants. Thus the probability of obtaining a modern sector job should be mainly 
determined by the stock and type of human capital the migrant owns other than his 
length of time staying in the UUUP. Whether or not a peasant should leave his farm 
and move to an urban area therefore is determined by the urban-rural differentials in 
the wage rates and good prices, the current interest rate, his personal assets, etc.  
 
In this section, we shall view the individual migration problem as an individual 
life-time utility maximization problem under the constraints that there are two 
different sets of market good prices and wage rates existing in urban areas and rural 
areas respectively. Our analysis excludes the consideration of the migration cost due 
to the fact it usually accounts for a negligible part in the lift-time income of a peasant, 
at least in China.  
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We discuss the migration decision of peasants with consideration of the role of human 
capital. It will be shown that the migration decision is nothing else but an extended 
life-time consumption problem where the decision-maker faces multiple sets of goods 
prices and best wage rates. Or in other words, it is a problem of cross-rural-urban 
consumption. 
Assume there is a rural peasant who can choose either to work and live in the rural 
area with low prices of commodities and a low best wage rate or to work and live in 
an urban area with high prices of commodities and a high best wage rate.  
 
Assume his utility function takes the following form: 
 
U=U(Cia,Hia …Cna, Hna, L),                                          (6.27) 
 
where Cia is the amount of ordinary commodity consumed either in the urban area 
indexed by Ciu or in the rural area indexed by Cir; Hia is the amount of human capital 
commodity consumed in the ith period either in the urban area indexed by Hiu or in the 
rural area indexed by Hir, a .  { , }r u∈
 
We assume that Cia and Hia are produced with the input of the market goods and the 
peasant’s own time. Let the amounts of ordinary goods and the combined time used 
be xci and tci , while the amounts of human capital goods and its combined time be xei 
and tei in period i respectively. Then, we have 
 
Cia=li(xci,tci), i=1,…n,                                              (6.28)  
 
and Hia=Ψi(xei,tei), i=1,…n.                                          (6.29)  
                                                                                     
We assume that li is concave in xci and tci, while Ψi is concave in xei and tei. Let the 
urban best wage rate be wui and rural best wage rate be wri and wui> wri.  
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Moreover, let  
 
tci+twi+tei=t   i=1, …n,                                            (6.30) 
 
where twi is the amount of working time in the ith period, and t, the total time available 
during period i, is independent of i (as all periods are equally long). 
Assume the function of human capital accumulation still takes the following 
form:  
 
Ei+1=Ei+Hi+kitwi-diEi, i=1,…,n,                               (6.31)   
                                         
where Ei+1 is the stock of human capital at the beginning of the i+1th period, di is the 
depreciation rate during period i; ki is the coefficient that measures the effect of 
on-the-job learning during period i. Additionally, assume di is increasing in i , while ki 
is decreasing in i. 0<di<1 and 0<ki<1. 
 
We still assume both the urban prices and rural prices in their life-time are known to 
the peasant. If he takes advantage of price and wage sets both in rural and urban areas, 
there must be a price combination drawn from the rural price set and the urban price 
set for each period of his life-time, which maximizes his life-time utility. The peasants 
who own a high level of initial capital will migrate to cities permanently, others who 
own a low level of initial capital just keep living in rural areas, and still others who 
own an intermediate level temporarily move to cities when they are young and own a 
relatively high stock of human capital, but eventually return to rural areas due to the 
fact that stocks of human capital decease seriously when they become old. 
 
A rational peasant will calculate and compare the utilities derived from the following 
2 pure life-types and any other possible mixed life-type and choose the one that brings 
him the highest utility. 
 98
The Rural-Urban Migration 
 
Pure life-type 1: 
 
The peasant works and lives in the rural area for all his life time. The corresponding 
budget constraint would be:  
 
1 1
1 1(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
n n
rei ei rci ci r i wi i
i n
i i
p x p x L w t v
r r− −= =
+ +
+ =
+ + +∑ ∑ ir i=1,…n, (6.32) 
where prci, prei and wri are the price of ordinary goods, price of human capital goods, 
and the best wage rate in period i in rural areas, respectively. 
 





(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
n n
rei ei rci ci r i ei ci r i i
i n
i i
p x p x w t t L w t v
r r ir− −= =
+ + + +
+ =
+ +∑ ∑ + ,i=1, …n.    (6.33) 
 
Pure life-type 2: 
 
The peasant works in urban areas. He has to accept the urban price and the 
corresponding constraint will be: 
 
1 1
1 1(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
n n
uei ei uci ci ui wi i
i n
i i
p x p x L w t v
r r− −= =
+ +
+ =
+ + +∑ ∑ ir , i=1, …n,    (6.34) 
where puci, puei and wui are the price of ordinary goods, price of human capital goods, 
and the best wage rate in period i in urban areas, respectively. 
 





(1 ) (1 )
n n
uei ei uci ci ui ei ci ui i
i i
i i
p x p x w t t L w t v
r r− −= =
+ + + + +
=
+ +∑ ∑ , i=1, …n.  (6.35) 
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(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
n n
aei ei aci ci ai ei ci ai i
i n
i i
p x p x w t t w t vL
r r− −= =
+ + + +
+ =
+ +∑ ∑ ir+ , i=1, …n, (6.36) 
where paci, paei and wai are the price of ordinary goods, price of human capital goods, 
and the best wage rate in period i either in rural areas or in urban areas, respectively.  
 
Note here we assume that the period length is sufficiently small so that no period can 
be split into one part in the rural and another one in the urban areas. 
 
In this case, for each period i, he will choose between working and consuming in the 
rural areas (ai=ri) and working and consuming in the urban areas (ai=ui). That is, if he 
chooses to work and live in the rural areas (or in the urban areas) in some period, he 
has to accept the rural prices (or the urban prices) of both the ordinary and human 
capital commodities in that period. Then in that period, paci, paei and wai will take the 
values of prci, prei, and wri (or puci, puei, and wui). Thus, his choices of all periods will 
form a feasible mixed life-type. It is clear that there are all together 2n-2 feasible 
mixed lifetypes (excluding two pure lifetypes), among which, by comparing the 
utilities, he will choose the one that provides him the highest utility. 
 









i=1,…n,   (6.37)  








 i=1,…n,    (6.38)  




(1 ) (1 )ei
n
aj wj jai i








+ +∑ 1 t∂  i=1,…n, (6.39)  
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(1 ) (1 )aei
n
aj wj jaei














.   (6.41) 
 
Under the optimal conditions, by comparing the corresponding utilities of all feasible 
mixed life-types, we can know what life type the peasant will eventually choose. It is 
clear that the reason Chinese peasants committing various kinds of rural-urban 
migration is that they are taking advantage of the rural-urban prices differences to 
maximize their lifetime utilities.  
 
6.5 Empirical Evidence 
 
Table 6.1 shows the relation of annual non-earning income per capita to the stock of 
human capital, the migration incidence, and the net income per capita of 5 different 
income groups of rural households living in the 592 State Designated Impoverished 
Counties in China 2007. We can see that all the net income per capita, stock of human 
capital, and migration incidence is positively related with the non-earning income per 












The Rural-Urban Migration 





















Illiteracy 14.1% 13.8% 11.4% 9.8% 8.3% 
Migration 
Incidence 




￥91.3 ￥120.3 ￥157.7 ￥201 ￥422.8 
Annual Net 
Income 
￥810.3 ￥1504.3 ￥2066.3 ￥2785.3 ￥4830.6 
 
Table 6.1 
Source: Calculated from the Poverty Monitoring Report of Rural China 2008, table 




From the above analysis, we know that the migration problem is essentially the 
extended lifetime consumption and human capital accumulation problem when there 
exists a significant rural-urban price differential. And the phenomenon of various 
types of migration choice is mainly brought in by the different holdings of personal 
lifetime funds among peasants. Some rich peasants migrate to and work in urban areas 
permanently, others with lower personal lifetime funds only migrate between rural 
and urban areas seasonally, and still others with the lowest personal lifetime funds 
stay in villages. Thus, due to the fact that holdings of personal lifetime funds are 
diverse among the peasants, some peasants owning abundant funds can finance 
themselves and obtain higher levels of human capital by consuming much more 
human capital commodities; while other peasants have to live in poverty due to 
insufficient funds.  
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Chapter 7 
 
The National Funds28 Allocation Efficiency in China 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
Without doubt, China has been the most rapidly growing economy in the world over the past 
three decades. However, nobody can deny the fact that the significant achievement was 
considerably due to the process of the world market gradually identifying and evaluating the 
market value of already existing physical and human capital accumulated during the Maoism 
and even earlier eras. In the process of China gradually unveiling itself in front of the world 
and introducing the market-economic system, some rise in income disparity was inevitable, 
but the rural-urban income disparity may have been exacerbated rather than mitigated by a 
number of intended national funds allocation policies which emphasized allocating the bulk 
of national funds to the urban residents while only leaving the negligible remainder to the 
rural residents. Additionally, various economic and administrative restrictions on rural-urban 
migration aiming to maintain the vested interests of urban residents, which are essentially 
equivalent to extracting migration tax in effect, have further limited opportunities of the poor 
rural population to struggle out of poverty successfully. Consequently, the Gini Coefficient of 
inequality has increased from 0.31 at the beginning of reform up to 0.475 in 2006 (Wen & 
Sun, 2008). Now, according the latest estimate, it is already above 0.5 (Cong & Li, 2010). 
 
The government’s recent policies shift to encourage migration, finance education and health 
for poor households in rural areas, and rebalance the economy away from investments and 
 
28 The national funds refer to the sum of PLF of the entire population in a country in this dissertation. 
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exports toward domestic consumption and public services, should help reduce the rural-urban 
income disparities, because implementing these policies can generally increase the incomes 
of the poor. However, a question arises here: Does transferring more national funds from the 
rich to the poor exert positive or negative influence on the economic growth in China?  In this 
chapter we will try to answer this question by using the data from the China Statistical Year 
Books. We argue that the peasants’ poverty problem is mainly due to the inappropriate funds 
allocation policies which emphasized allocating the bulk of the national funds to the urban 
residents, especially those residing in the metropolitan cities. These inappropriate funds 
allocation policies may have reduced rather than promoted economic growth in the past. With 
the process of identification and evaluation of China’s existing capital approaching its end, 
the negative effects of these inappropriate funds allocation policies gradually have shown up 
and become more and more serious. The frequent social chaos, conflicts, and the extensive 
complaints from the peasants have been sending danger signals to the governments. It is high 
time, we argue, for the central government of China to adjust its national funds allocation 
policies and advocate a both just and efficient economic development pattern. 
 
In chapter 5, we have seen that there are many factors that affect an individual’s lifetime 
earnings and income. These factors include the individual lifetime utility function, the market 
prices of human capital goods and ordinary goods, the transforming coefficient (or function) 
of the stocks of human capital to the best wage rates, the human capital accumulation 
function, the length of life n, interest rate r, the individual innate endowment, and the 
individual lifetime funds. These factors in fact can be divided into three types: the nature-
determined factors, the market-dominated factors and the government-dominated factors. The 
nature-determined factors are the individual lifetime utility functions, lifetime n, the 
individual innate endowment and the individual human capital accumulation function. 
Although people cannot change these factors, they can be aware of the probability 
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distributions of these factors and take advantage of the corresponding expected values when 
they make decisions. For instance, we don’t know how long a specific person will live, but 
we can calculate the expected length of life with the data of the life length distribution of the 
population he belongs to and use it to make decisions. The market-dominated factors are the 
market prices of human capital and ordinary commodities, the transforming coefficient (or 
function) of the stocks of human capital to the best wage rates, and the market interest rate r, 
which should be dominated by the market force other than governments to save the overall 
transaction costs in an economy (see Cheung, 1974; Coarse, 1937; Gould & Henry 1967).  
 
However, the PLF are dominated by governments since the governments can affect and adjust 
them by a tax-and-subsidy program. As we noted before, the non-earning income in each 
period is defined as the sum of personal periodical property income and periodical transfer 
income from the governments; the lifetime stream of non-earning incomes for an individual is 
his PLF that can be discounted and aggregated into the present value (or final value), given 
the interest rates over time. According to the implications derived from chapter 5, the PLF are 
very important because they determine the financing capability of an individual in the capital 
market, which in turn determines the extent of lifetime human capital accumulation and the 
corresponding amounts of lifetime earning and income. If the amount of PLF of an individual 
is lower than some standard, he might have to suffer from poverty in his lifetime. Thus, his 
talent will therefore be wasted too. However, with the theoretical model in chapter 5, we 
cannot derive any specific shape of the relationship between the expected PLE and PLF (see 
p. 109 for the explanation of the expected PLE). What we know is that the expected PLE is 
restricted by the PLF. What is the specific relationship between the expected PLE and PLF 
for the people in China? We attempt to explore it empirically in this chapter. Before we 
proceed to our own exploration, a brief literature review seems very helpful. 
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7.2 Literature Review 
 
We start with the Kuznets hypothesis. Kuznets’ work was to explore “the character and 
causes of the long-term changes in the personal distribution of income” (Kuznets, 1955, p. 1). 
For this purpose, Kuznets (1955, p. 1) asked two corresponding questions: “Does inequality 
in the distribution of income increase or decrease in the course of a country’s economic 
growth? What factors determine the secular level and trends of income inequalities?” As a 
finding of his research, the Kuznets hypothesis was proposed: Income inequality in an 
economy will become worse over the initial stages of development as the economy 
transforms from rural to urban and from agricultural to industrial; subsequently, inequality 
will decrease as the labor force in the industrial sector expands and that in the agricultural 
sector falls (Kuznets, 1955). The graphical representation of Kuznets’ hypothesis (the 
Kuznets curve) is an inverted U shaped curve. However the Kuznets hypothesis only suggests 
an answer to the first question he asked, while it has little to do with the second. According to 
the numerical illustration he used, it seems that the only factor that affects inequality is the 
relative population of the rural sector compared to that of the urban sector, which is the only 
dependent variable in his formulation.  
 
Alesina & Rodrik (1994) proposed a model to answer the latter of Kuznets’ two questions 
based on the assumption that government spending is used entirely for the purpose of 
production. They argued that the growth rate of an economy is determined by the after-tax 
return to capital: The higher after-tax return to capital leads to the higher rate of economic 
growth. The tax on capital has a nonlinear effect on the after-tax return to capital: When the 
tax rate on capital is small, the productivity-enhancing effect of public spending dominates, 
and the after-tax return to capital increases as the tax rate is raised; when a tax rate on capital 
is large, the after-tax return to capital falls as the tax rate raised. This relationship between the 
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rate of economic growth and the tax on capital can be represented by an inverse U-curve: the 
growth rate first increases, and then decreases, as the tax on capital progressively raised. 
According to the Median Voter Theorem29, Alesina & Rodrik (1994, p. 465) concluded that 
“the greater the inequality of wealth and income, the higher the rate of taxation, and the lower 
growth.” 
 
Banerjee & Newman (1991) develop a stochastic theory of wealth distribution with a dynamic 
model. Their dynamic model focuses on the role of incomplete insurance in generating 
inequality and showed that lineage wealth and the long-run population distribution of wealth 
follow a Markov process which converges globally to an ergodic distribution.  
 
Li and Zou (1998) also argued that the economic growth rate is determined by the tax rate on 
capital. However, in their paper, they divide the government spending into two parts: 
Production service and consumption service- the former enters the production function, while 
the latter enters the individual utility function. Using the Median Voter Theorem, they drew 
an opposite conclusion to that of Alesina & Rodrik’s : When income distribution is more 
equal, the income tax rate is higher and the economic growth rate is lower.  
 
Calor and Zeira (1993) showed that if the capital market is imperfect, the distribution of 
wealth significantly affects the aggregate economic activity. They considered the role of 
human capital accumulation for economic growth and concluded that the economic growth is 
affected by the initial distribution of wealth, or more specifically by the percentage of 
individuals who inherit a large enough wealth to enable them to invest in human capital.  
 
29For an explanation of the Median Voter Theorem, See Black (1948). 
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Quite a few economists did empirical investigations on the relationships between economic 
growth and various inequalities, including the impact of growth on the income distribution, 
the impact of income inequality on the economic growth, the impact of asset inequality on the 
economic growth, and the impact of redistribution on the economic growth. Table 7.1 
summarizes their empirical results. Among the four papers on the impact of the economic 
growth on the income distribution, all agree that there is no impact; the two papers on the 
impact of the asset inequality on economic growth, both agree on a negative impact; the two 
papers on the impact of redistribution on economic growth, agree on a positive impact; 
however, on the impact of the income inequality on economic growth, there are six works: 
two argue for no impact, two for a negative impact, and two for a positive impact.  
 
The Empirical Results on the Relation between Growth and Inequalities 
Impact of growth on income distribution  
Dollar& Kraay (2002) 
Easterly (1999) 
Chen & Ravallion (1997) 





Impact of income inequality on growth  
Forbes (2000) 
Li & Zou (1998) 
Barro (2000) 
Lopez (2004) 








Impact of asset inequality on growth  
Deininger & Squire (1998) 
Birdsall & Londono (1997) 
negative 
negative 
Impact of redistribution on growth  
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So far, we can see that there is no unanimous agreement on the specific relationship between 
the wealth (or income) inequality and the economic growth both in the theoretical and 
empirical literature. However, at least for one thing, economists are quite unanimous: The 
wealth distribution does matter for economic growth, which will be the starting point of our 
analysis. 
 
7.3 Possible Relations between the Expected PLE and the PLF 
 
We now imagine an open economy30 with a given population number of N and a given 
quantity K as the total national funds. The total national funds, as the sum of all PLF of the 
individuals in this economy, consist of the stream of all current and expected future incomes 
from various rents and interests, namely all current and future expected non-earning incomes, 
of which the total value is assumed not to be affected by various approaches to funds 
allocation among the population. That is, however the current national funds are allocated, 
the total value of the national funds does not change. Suppose the national funds are 
collectively owned by all individuals, who have no private assets before a social planner 
allocates a certain amount of funds to them. The social planner first decides on an initial 
allocation of the national funds among the individuals, and then lets the individuals make 
their respective livelihoods with their own shares of funds under a price-mediated market 
economic system in their lifetimes. When an individual passes away, he is allowed to leave 
inheritance to his offspring (for simplicity, assuming only one). However, if the quantity of 
 
30In an open economy, the prices of commodities and interest rates are determined by the world markets. Thus 
we actually assume that any adjustment of the distribution of national funds will not affect the prices of 
commodities and interest rates. This assumption is only for convenience. In fact, one can find that even if this 
assumption does not hold, the conclusion is the same.  
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his inheritance exceeds the PLF standard of his offspring’s generation, some of the excessive 
part will be taxed according to a tariff and then be reallocated.  Note that different individuals 
might achieve different PLEs even if they are allocated the same quantity of PLF, because 
they might differ in the nature-determined factors like the innate talent, luck and so on, which 
inevitably affect their respective lifetime incomes, lifetime consumption, and lifetime 
earnings. Assume the probabilities of the distributions of these nature-determined factors are 
known to all individuals as common knowledge; when the social planner decides on the 
allocation plan of the total national funds, he knows nothing about the true values of those 
influential factors but knows the probabilities of their distributions. Now, to simplify, assume 
each individual will, with probability ρ(s), create a high-value PLE, Ih(s), while with 
probability 1-ρ(s) he will create a low-value PLE, Il(s), where s represents the quantity of PLF 
he owns and Ih(s)> Il(s).  Thus, each combination (Ih, Il, ρ) corresponds to a value of s. The 
expected personal lifetime income of any individual i then equals (Ihi(s)+si)ρi(s)+ 
(Ili(s)+si)(1-ρi(s)). For any individual, when s is given, his problem is the human capital 
accumulation problem introduced in chapter 5, migration problem introduced in chapter 6, or 
both. Even if we further assume the individual himself does not know the true values of those 
influential factors but only the probabilities, he will face a problem under uncertainty, which, 
however, does not change our conclusions derived in the previous chapters. 
 
Now our problem is: What allocation plan will be adopted by the social planner who is 
assumed to maximize the aggregate lifetime earnings of the people? Note that this goal is 
equivalent to maximize the aggregate lifetime incomes of the people, since the aggregate 
lifetime incomes are the sum of the aggregate PLEs and the aggregated PLF. The latter is 
rather a given condition than a goal for the social planner. Nonetheless, the social planner 
may pursue other goals, e.g., to maximize the utility of the median voter in a democratic 
regime (see Black, 1948), or just to maximize the social planner’s own utility. Our attention 
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presently focuses on the relationship between the expected PLE and PLF, which is a matter 
directly derived from our human capital accumulation model in chapter 5. We only focus on 
this question: If the social planner wants to achieve the maximal possible economic growth 
measured by the aggregate incomes or earnings of the entire population during the length of 
lifetime, how he can use the relationship between the expected PLE (I ) and PLF( s)? 
 
Our following discussion will focus on a sufficiently large finite domain [0, M] rather than on 
[0, ], where M is greater than the maximal possible amount of PLF that an individual is 
allowed to own in the economy. It is evident that there exists at least one global maximum of 
I within the domain [0, M]. For convenience, we now only analyze three basic possible 
shapes of the relationship between I and s within an interval with only one local maximum. It 
is also clear that, within the domain [0, M], the I-s curve can have only finitely many such 
intervals. Thus, if a real I-s curve consists of multiple such intervals, we can analyze the PLF 
allocation efficiency in each of these intervals, and then compare and choose the most 
efficient one.  
+∞
 
Case 1: the expected personal lifetime earning I is increasing and linear in s until the 
point B, at which I reaches its maximum V and then it may decline to a conservative 
level between zero and V. 31
 
In Figure 7.1, the marginal value of I is identical in the interval [0, B], which means as long  
 31 It is evident that after B, the I-s curve will no longer increase; moreover, for any sr that is greater than B, there 
is an sl that is less than or equal to B, such that I(sl) is equal or greater than I(sr) . Therefore, we do not consider 
the shape of the I-s curve after point B, because allocating an amount of PLF above B to an individual is 
inefficient from the point of view of the social planner who is assumed to maximize the aggregate amount of 
PLEs of the entire population. 
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as s is no greater than B, no matter how the social planner allocates the total national funds 
among the people, the economy always yields the same quantity of aggregate expected 
earning. Thus, an equalitarian allocation plan should be adopted by the social planner, since 
on the one hand, it causes no damage to economic efficiency measured by the aggregate 
value of lifetime income and earning, on the other hand, it is a socially just allocation.  In 
other words, the egalitarian funds allocation plan causes no contradiction between the 
economic efficiency and social justice. The total public funds K therefore should be allocated 
to all individuals in an egalitarian manner and each individual should own the quantity of K/N 
as his share of PLF. 
 




Case 2: the expected personal lifetime earning I is increasing and concave in s until the 
point B, at which I reaches its maximum V and then it may decline to a conservative 
level between  zero and  V. 
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The marginal value of I is decreasing in s in figure 7.2, thus, in order to obtain the maximum 
aggregate expected earnings in this economy, each individual should again be allocated a 
quantity of PLF K/N in an egalitarian manner. On the one hand, the egalitarian allocation 
ensures the economic efficiency measured by the aggregate value of lifetime incomes and 
earnings in this case; on the other hand, it is a socially just allocation. 
 




Case 3: the expected earning function I is increasing and convex in s until B at which I 
reaches its maximum V and then it may decline to a conservative level between zero and 
V.  
 
The marginal value of I is increasing in s in Figure 7.3. Only in this case, an unequal 
distribution of total national funds might be adopted by the social planner since an egalitarian 
allocation will reduce the economic efficiency measured by the aggregate value of lifetime 
incomes and earnings. Only in this case, there exists a conflict between economic efficiency 
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and social justice.  
 
In this case, if the social planner only cares and pursues the economic goal, the total national 
funds first should be allocated to K/B lucky individuals.  Each of them will have the quantity 
B of personal lifetime funds; the remainder of the national funds, if there is one, will be 
allocated to an additional individual while leaving all other individuals with no funds. 
However, probably, the social planner will choose some trade-off between the economic 
efficiency and social justice in this case.  
 




From the above analysis, we can conclude that the distribution of national funds is very 
important; there should exist an efficient allocation that induces the maximum aggregate 
expected earnings as well as the maximum aggregate expected income for a given economy. 
If the social planner does not re-allocate national funds appropriately among its people, that is, 
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if there is no funds reallocation mechanism in an economy, then there might exist inefficiency 
measured by the aggregate income and earning in this economy. Thus, in this sense, an 
appropriate tax and subsidy system is crucial for a country to develop efficiently. 
 
7.3 Empirical Analysis 
 
To begin with, let us first have a glance at various income disparities between rural and urban 
residents in China. 
 
7.3.1 The Trends of Per-Capita Income of Urban and Rural Residents 
 
Figure 7.4 shows the annual per-capita incomes of urban and rural residents from 1978 to 
2008.  The ratio of urban to rural per-capita income in Figure 7.4 decreased from 2.57 in 
1978 to 1.86 in 1985 showing the initial benefits of the HRS assigning farmland to farm 
households, which dramatically increased the personal funds of the rural residents (Adelman 
& Morris, 1973; Adelman, 1977; Adelman & Sunding, 1987). However, as shown in Figure 
7.5, the ratio increased in favor of the urban residents afterwards, rising steadily from the 
middle 1980s to 2008 when it reached 3.59. Thus the income disparity between urban and 
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Source: Calculated from China Statistical Yearbooks 1996-2009 
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7.3.2 The Trends of Per-Capita Earnings of Urban and Rural Residents 
 
Figure 7.6 shows the per capita earnings of urban and rural residents from 1985 to 2008. The 
trend in general is quite similar to that of the income. However, the urban to rural per capita 
earning ratio shown in Figure 7.7 is smaller than that of per-capita income generally, which 
indicates that non-earning income disparity is much more serious than the earning income 
does. 
 






















































Source: calculated from China Statistical Yearbooks 1996-2009 
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Source: calculated from China Statistical Yearbooks 1996-2009 
 
7.3.3 The Trends of Per Capita Non-Earning Income of Urban and Rural Residents 
 
Figure 7.8 shows that since 1985, the per capita non-earning income of urban residents 
increased fast, while that of the rural residents is almost stagnant due to the unequal funds 
allocation policies emphasizing the priority of the urban residents.  
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Source: calculated from China Statistical Yearbooks 1996-2009 
 
Figure 7.9 shows the trend of the ratio which starts from a relative low base 3.52 in 1985 and 
increases to a peak of 11.12 in 2003. However, it also shows that in recent years, it has begun 
to decline due to the policy adjustment of the central government.   
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Source: calculated from China Statistical Yearbooks 1996-2009 
 
7.3.4 An Estimate for the Relationship between the Expected PLE and PLF in China  
 
If we have data of earning incomes and non-earning incomes of each period of lifetime of 
individuals of a whole generation who own various PLF but face the same market-determined 
factors, then we can exactly estimate the relationship between the expected PLE and PLF. 
Unfortunately, however, we have not gotten such data so far. What we can do now is to 
roughly estimate the relationship between them with the data at group level. The China 
Statistical Year Books provide data of per capita non-earning income and per capita earning 
of Chinese rural residents by income quintile from 2002 to 2008. We shall calculate the 
present values of seven years rather than a lifetime’s of the per capita earnings and per capita 
non-earning income streams for each of the five income groups. We shall also calculate the 
present value of the corresponding seven years of the per-capita earnings and per-capita non-
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earning income stream of the urban residents. With five numbers derived from the rural 
population and one number derived from the urban residents, we can then draw a scatter 
diagram to show the shape of the relation curve between the present values of per-capital 
earning and per-capita non-earning income of seven years. To calculate the present values, the 
one-year interest rates of saving of the same time period (2002-2008) are applied as the 
discount factors (for the data on the interest rates, see A-1 in the appendix). Since the 
following figure shows the relation of seven years rather than lifetime, it can only be taken as 
a rough estimate of the lifetime relationship between the expected PLE and PLF (for the 
numerical data of Figure 7.10, see A-2 in the appendix). 
 
The Scatter Diagram of the Present Values of Eanings to
Non-Earning Income of the 7 Years from 2002 to 2008
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Figure 7.10 shows the functional shape of the seven-year present value of per capita earnings 
to the seven-year present value of per capita non-earning incomes, with which we can see that 
curve is concave since its slope is decreasing (see A-2 in the appendix for the numerical data). 
If this curve, as an approximation, truly reflects the relationship between the lifetime earnings 
and the lifetime personal funds, then, according to our analysis in section 7.3, increasing 
national funds of the rural residents will improve economic performance of China since the 
rural residents have higher rate of return of expected PLE to PLF than that of the urban 
residents. 
 
7.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
Although there might be some statistical errors in the above analysis, we believe that the 
result of our empirical exploration is still plausible: The average ratio between the earning 
and the non-earning- income of rural residents is many times that of the urban residents, 
which can, to some extent, cover all statistical errors.  Thus, we can conclude that, due to the 
neglect of the central government of China in the past and lacking a non-earning income 
transfer system in China, too much funds have been allocated to the urban residents in the 
past; the huge rural-urban income disparity and the peasants’ poverty may be caused by the 
inappropriate funds allocation policies which may have damaged economic efficiency rather 
than have ensured it.   
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Chapter 8 
 




The level of absolute poverty in China indeed has been dramatically relieved by the 
efforts of the Chinese central government with its poverty reduction strategies and 
policies in different phases in the past 30 years. However, the level of income 
disparity, especially the rural-urban income disparity has increased to an intolerable 
level, which is reflected, e.g., by the high Gini Index of 0.5 in 2010. On the one hand, 
this high level of income disparity has been causing much social instability and 
increased the tension between the poor and the rich; on the other hand, it also may 
restrict and impede further economic growth in China since huge potential talents of 
the poor class, who are indeed the majority in the population, will be wasted. 
 
In this dissertation, a series of economic models have been proposed for analyzing the 
behavior of peasants including the job choice between farm and non-farm jobs, land 
rent determination, human capital accumulation, and rural-urban migration. Our 
models are able to provide reasonable explanations of various economic phenomena 
related to Chinese peasants. For instance, the land rent determination model can 
explain the reasons for the prevailing existence of small scale farms in rural China; 
the human capital accumulation model can explain the “poverty trap” in a novel 
sense;32 the migration model can provide the reasons for the temporary and 




32For a definition of “poverty trap”, see Azariadis & Stachurski, 2005. 
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analysis, we have figured out the key factors that determine the individual lifetime 
income and earning. These factors include the individual preference for ordinary 
goods and human capital goods over time, or in other words, the lifetime utility 
function, the market prices of human capital goods and ordinary goods, the 
transforming coefficient with which a certain stock of human capital can be 
transformed into a certain wage rate, the human capital accumulation function, length 
of life n, interest rate r, the individual innate endowment and the individual assets of 
lifetime. We divided these factors into 3 types: the nature-determined factors, the 
market-determined factors, and the government-determined factors. We can not know 
the exact values of these factors of every specific person, but we can be aware of the 
probability distributions of these factors among the population and take advantage of 
the corresponding expected values to make decision. The market-determined factors 
include various market prices of ordinary goods and interest rate. A factor that can be 
determined, at least at some extent, by governments in a market economy is the PLF, 
since it can be affected and adjusted by the tax and subsidy programs implemented by 
governments. In order to increase the lifetime incomes of the poor, their stocks of 
human capital must be increased. However, their human capital accumulation is 
restricted by their PLF. In case the amount of PLF is small, there will also be little 
accumulation of human capital and low lifetime earning and income. Our models 
have shown that in order to fight poverty and reduce income disparity, funds transfer 
from the rich to the poor is unavoidable. However, a question arises immediately: 
Does this transfer from the rich to the poor damage economic efficiency and impede 
economic growth in China?  In chapter 7, we discussed 3 different shapes of the 
relationship curve, namely, linear, concave, and convex, between the expected 
personal lifetime earning and personal lifetime funds and argued that unless the true 
shape is convex, a pro-poor and perhaps egalitarian national funds allocation can 
increase the aggregate efforts of the population of an economy and then promote a 
fast and just economic growth. Evidence from China first showed that the long-term 
relationship between the present values of earning and non-earning income is most 
likely to be concave after a turning point. The ratios of the present value of earning of 
 124
Review and Conclusions 
to the present value of non-earning income of seven-years of the subpopulations of 
rural residents are dramatically higher than that of urban residents, which, to some 
extent, indicates that transfers of non-earning income from the urban residents to the 
poor rural residents will increase the aggregate earnings and income of China.      
 
8.2 Conclusions  
 
Our analyses reveal that economic growth alone may not solve the problem of poverty. 
Human capital is one of the key forces of promoting economic growth. However, 
human capital accumulation is restricted by the personal lifetime funds: insufficient 
lifetime funds lead to a low level of human capital and low lifetime earning and 
income, while too high personal lifetime funds also lead to low lifetime earning since 
with the increase of personal lifetime funds, people tend to work less, which will 
reduce their lifetime earnings. Earning is a measure and indicator of the human capital 
stock and its use. The distribution of national funds not only affects the distribution of 
human capital but also determines how much of the effort of people will be used to 
promote the economic growth and development. In this sense, the true relation 
between the PLE and the PLF is very important. We used data from China to explore 
the relationship and found that a pro-poor and equalitarian allocation of non-earning 
income may not only reduce Chinese peasants’ poverty but also promote economic 
growth and development of China. 
 
8.3 Suggestions for Further Research 
 
First, we suggest works to confirm the results of this study by eliminating flaws and to 
apply the methodology to other countries. Then, we suggest to study and design an 
income information collection mechanism for China, which makes a rational citizen 
truthfully report his income from various sources (wage, profit, rent, interest, etc.) to 
the government. This mechanism should include a set of rules, under which a rational 
individual has no incentive to hide information about his true income. Finally, a more 
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accurate estimate of the relationship between the expected PLE and the PLF in China 
is suggested. To do this, an investigation of lifetime incomes seems necessary.  
 
At last, let us end this dissertation with a meaningful sentence on the back cover of 
“The End of Poverty” (Sachs, 2005):  
 










A- 1: The One-Year Interest Rates of Saving (2002-2008) 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
1.98% 1.98% 1.98% 2.25% 2.52% 3.56% 3.06% 
 
Note: if more than one interest rate applies within a year, we average them for that 
year. 
 























A- 2: The Numerical Data of Figure 7.10 
(Unit: Yuan) 
PV earning per capita 6660.75 12784.67 18146.05 25409.76 47230.12 37912.32 
PV non-earning per capita 573.80 835.10 1120.35 1676.77 4912.05 13586.55 
The slope between  
2 adjacent points 
 
23.44 18.80 13.05 6.74 -1.07 
 
Note: In the China Statistical Year Books, a household income is divided into four 
categories: wage income, net business income (or net income from rural household 
operations), property income, and transfer income. We sum the first two as “earning 





















A- 3: The Numerical Data of Figure 7.4 and Figure 7.5 
(Unit: Yuan) 
Year Rural  
per–capita  





1978 343.4 133.6 2.57 
1980 477.6 191.3 2.50 
1985 739.1 397.6 1.86 
1989 1374 602 2.28 
1995 4288.09 1577.74 2.72 
1996 4844.78 1926.07 2.52 
1997 5188.54 2090.13 2.48 
1998 5458.34 2161.98 2.52 
1999 5888.77 2210.34 2.66 
2000 6295.91 2253.42 2.79 
2001 6907.08 2366.40 2.92 
2002 8177.4 2475.63 3.30 
2003 9061.22 2622.24 3.46 
2004 10128.51 2936.4 3.45 
2005 11320.77 3254.93 3.48 
2006 12719.19 3587.04 3.55 
2007 14908.61 4140.36 3.60 












A- 4: The Numerical Data of Figure 7.6 and Figure 7.7 
(Unit: Yuan) 








1985 367.69 643.35 1.75 
1990 650.52 1187.72 1.83 
1993 865.89 2103.53 2.43 
1994 1137.26 2820.29 2.48 
1995 1470.99 3457.89 2.35 
1996 1803.9 3900.7 2.16 
1997 1974.17 4109.23 2.08 
1998 2026.89 4235.98 2.09 
1999 2025.91 4497.16 2.22 
2000 2069.49 4720.41 2.28 
2001 2178.15 5098.62 2.34 
2002 2278.08 6024.36 2.64 
2003 2420.28 6814.04 2.82 
2004 2711.31 7646.63 2.82 
2005 2987.87 8477.16 2.84 
2006 3271.77 9576.52 2.93 
2007 3755.36 11175.48 2.98 







A- 5: The Numerical Data of Figure 7.8 and Figure 7.9 
(Unit: Yuan) 









1985 29.91 105.57 3.53 
1990 35.79 335.07 9.36 
1993 55.73 479.63 8.61 
1994 83.72 682.02 8.15 
1995 106.75 830.18 7.78 
1996 122.17 944.08 7.73 
1997 115.96 1079.31 9.31 
1998 135.09 1222.36 9.05 
1999 184.43 1391.61 7.55 
2000 183.93 1596.4 8.68 
2001 188.25 1808.46 9.61 
2002 197.55 2153.04 10.90 
2003 201.96 2247.18 11.13 
2004 225.09 2481.88 11.03 
2005 267.06 2843.61 10.65 
2006 315.27 3142.67 9.97 
2007 385 3733.13 9.70 
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